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ABSTRACT
Building on work by Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen that suggests that
democratizing states are more likely to form new international governmental organizations rather
than join existing ones, I ask the question: how do these states design the organizations they
form, and how do those design choices compare to the choices made by consolidated
democracies and by nondemocracies? I focus on three design choices made by states regarding
membership constraints, voting procedures, and dispute resolution processes. By comparing and
analyzing founding charters, I find that democratizing states were more likely to constrain access
to membership into these organizations to regional partners during the Cold War period. Regime
type does not appear to drive choices relating to voting design or dispute resolution mechanisms,
but states of each regime type are more likely to formalize dispute resolution procedures in
economically oriented organizations.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

International cooperation has a long and storied history, going back hundreds of years.
The 1648 Peace of Westphalia established the idea of state sovereignty and free and equal
nations; no actor was above the state. Only a few years later, in 1651, Thomas Hobbes argued in
The Leviathan that the state of nature was predisposed to suppress cooperation between selfish
actors. The international system is one of self-help, and cooperation or conflict is up to each
individual actor in the system. Cooperation, he argued, could not be possible without a strong
regulatory central authority. Yet, self-interested states consistently cooperate under the
international condition of anarchy. Fast forward nearly 200 years and we arrive at the Congress
of Vienna, where the Concert of Europe was established by the great powers in response to
Napoleon’s France, and a decision was made that no one power should become so dominant
again because the cost of war was too great (Langhorne, 1986). Of course, this did not mean an
end to wars, but it did signal a willingness by states to work together toward a common goal that
would yield benefits for all. As this brief discussion suggests, a full examination of the history of
cooperation would go back hundreds of years and include numerous actors, treaties, some
successes, and plenty of failures. There is plenty of existing work providing such an
examination, and from it we know that states do, indeed, cooperate with each other because
cooperation yields benefits. Over time, states have formalized cooperation by developing
international governmental organizations (IGOs).
International organizations play important roles in addressing problems that

1

individual states have difficulty addressing on their own. They can assist groups of states in
achieving common goals and can also hinder cooperation in various ways. One way is through
agency slack, which occurs when the organization is designed in a way that grants too much
discretion or too much autonomy to the organization (Hawkins et al., 2006) Another is agency
slippage, which happens when the preferred outcomes of the organization shift away from the
member states’ interests, resulting in a shift in policy (Pollack, 1997). They often constrain the
action of member states in challenging ways. International organizations continue to exist and be
formed by states because they generally provide benefits to states that would otherwise be out of
reach. Since the early 1900s, the number of international governmental organizations (IGOs) has
increased, that increase experienced a substantial uptick immediately following the end of the
Cold War. The idea of cooperation through formal organizations is nothing new, but over time it
has evolved and we, as scholars, are presented with extensive opportunities to investigate how
and why states choose to cooperate through IGOs despite sometimes high sovereignty costs, hard
costs, and potential cooperation failure.
Some of the earliest examples of formal, institutionalized multilateral cooperation
between states arose from a need to standardize actions among sovereign states in the interest of
increasing efficiency. In the early 1800s, European economic development depended on
increased trade through shipping, compelling those states sharing access to critical shipping
avenues to coordinate policies regarding that access. A need quickly arose to regulate movement
on the Rhine River, and eventually the Danube River, to facilitate international shipping and
travel more efficiently and effectively between the countries through which these rivers run. The
Central Commission for Rhine Navigation emerged and became “the sole international agency
charged with administration of the Rhine,” (Collinson, 1972). Shortly thereafter, in 1856, the
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European Commission of the Danube was established for similar reasons. In 1865, the
International Telegraph Union (ITU), was created as the result of a conference of twenty
European state representatives meeting to organize telegraph networks across Europe (Codding,
Jr., 1995). A year later the organization created the first permanent secretariat in an international
organization, ushering in a new model of formalized interstate cooperation Europe. The ITU still
exists today, holding bragging rights as the oldest IGO in operation and continuing to facilitate
global communication through consistent international standards.
These organizations created in the 19th century arose from a need to standardize actions
among sovereign states in the interest of increasing efficiency and gave states a forum to discuss
ideas aimed at facing international challenges. They evolved as technologies and needs have
changed, and many continue to facilitate cooperation for their member states even in the 21st
century. Since these early instances of formalized cooperation, the number of IGOs in the
international system has fluctuated; we have seen the creation of hundreds of new organizations
while others have become obsolete and “died.” Today, the international system has several
hundred active international governmental organizations (IGOs) in operation, giving scholars
ample opportunity to investigate how and why formalized cooperation manifests between
sovereign state governments. What makes IGOs interesting to study is that there is substantial
variation across many dimensions, including mandate, membership restrictions, power
distribution, and design, just to name a few. The literature generally agrees that what motivates
states to form or join IGOs is that cooperation can provide collective benefits to those states with
shared interests.
Many of the most powerful and visible IGOs were formed by the strong Allied Power
states, led by the rich democracies, in response to the aftermath of two great wars and the
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political and economic uncertainty they caused. Since the end of the Second World War, the
international community has seen a rise in the number of IGOs in the system. Membership in
IGOs can provide important benefits, such as access to major economic markets, increased levels
of security and defense, and, in the most powerful and lucrative IGOs, a seat at the largest and
most important political tables in the international community. They can also provide expertise
and resources to improve the global environment by creating privileged groups that can
encourage cooperation by shouldering many of the costs associated with environmental
protections and necessary technological advancement.
A turning point for international organizations can be seen in the interwar period, where
states were faced with overcoming the devastating physical, political, and economic losses from
World War I and the critical challenge to ensure that another conflict of that scale never happen
again. In 1919, Woodrow Wilson introduced the idea of a League of Nations, which would serve
as “an international body which could broker agreements between states on specific issues or on
problems which were proving particularly difficult to solve” (Henig, 7). Despite being the
darling of the American President, the United States failed to ratify accession to the League and
never became a member; neither did the Soviet Union or Germany, the three greatest powers at
the time. Among the reasons for not joining was that a) the Council was made up of a
combination of great powers and less powerful states, each with equal voting power, and b)
decisions had to be made unanimously.
In 1931, an explosion in Japan destroyed a section of railroad tracks. The Japanese
government blamed China, a country Japan already had a tense relationship with, and responded
by sending the Japanese Imperial Army into the Chinese province of Manchuria. China
retaliated, answering the invasion with force. They also appealed to the League of Nations in an
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effort to try and regain control of Manchuria, and the League passed a resolution ordering the
withdrawal of Japanese troops. As part of the resolution, the League established a commission
that would be charged with an independent investigation of each party’s claims of sovereignty
violation and the use of violence. However, Japan rejected the League’s decision and insisted on
negotiating directly with the Chinese outside of the scope of the League. When negotiations
broke down, Japan fortified efforts in Manchuria and launched an attack on Shanghai, further
exacerbating the conflict. Eventually, the Japanese delegation walked out of the League, literally
and figuratively, leaving in the middle of the Geneva Assembly and effectively ending the
League altogether (Wright, 1932).
The inception and quick failure of League of Nations taught states that simply creating a
forum for discussion would not be enough to solve the increasingly complex problems that were
emerging. The League suffered from a myriad of issues, quite importantly that the great powers
did not participate, calling the legitimacy of the “League of Nations” into question. The
distribution of power within the organization was not reflective of reality, as each member of the
decision-making body wielded the same degree of control with its one vote and each held veto
power, as decisions required unanimous agreement. The inability of the organization to resolve
the dispute between Japan and China revealed a lack of teeth in its dispute resolution mechanism,
resulting in a breakdown to the point of institutional failure. Eight years later, World War II
would break out, proving once and for all that the League had not served its purpose of
facilitating cooperation and avoiding conflict.
Consequently, the Allied powers spearheaded the creation of a new universal
organization aimed at avoiding conflict and encouraging peaceful interactions, but that also
reflected the reality of the distribution of power within the international system. A bicameral
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system was implemented, creating two separate bodies, each with different powers and different
responsibilities. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) was created to include every
member state, each endowed with one vote regardless of wealth or political power. Here,
member states can address issues of international importance. The UNGA serves both as a
forum for discussion and as the main deliberative and policymaking organ, issuing
recommendations on issues ranging from economics to human rights and everything in between.
The most democratic organ of the UN, most UNGA resolutions only require a simple majority
(fifty percent plus one) to pass. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is designed to
reflect a more accurate representation of the real-world distribution of power and is a main
reason the UN was able to garner participation from the major global powers following the
failure of most of them to join the League of Nations. Here, the five major powers, known as the
Permanent Five (P5) the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia (then the USSR), and China
all have permanent seats on the fifteen-member Council. The other ten rotate between the rest of
the members every two years. While each member has one vote in the UNSC, only the P5 have
veto power. Decisions are only passed if nine out of the fifteen, including each of the P5
members, are in favor. If one of the P5 objects, the decision fails.
The shift in design approach to the distribution of power within the United Nations was
critical to both its development and its survival. This is because design matters. A lot. Yet we, as
scholars, still do not have a full understanding of the motivations behind design choices made by
states who decide to form a new international organization. This series of papers is an attempt to
advance the design literature by presenting an examination of design choices made by states with
different regime types.
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This project consists of three papers, each focusing on a specific element of institutional
design in the context of institutions formed by states with different regime types. It is an attempt
to further the literature on international cooperation by linking work focused on IGO formation,
IGO capacity to facilitate democratic consolidation, and IGO design. Poast and Urpelainen
(2018) find that democratizing states are more likely to form new international organizations
than they are to join existing ones, often because the accession criteria are too difficult to
achieve. Pevehouse (2005) argues that joining international organizations, and especially
regional organizations, can help states transition from autocracy to democracy through
mechanisms including hands-tying and credibility-building. Koremenos et al. (2001) present a
rational design approach to design by identifying five key design-related dimensions of
institutional variation. These three critical works form the foundation for this project, which is,
of course, bolstered by the work of countless other scholars whose insight I also rely on to
structure my arguments. I ask the question: how do democratizing states design the organizations
they form, and how do those design choices compare to the choices made by consolidated
democracies and by nondemocracies?
The first paper in this series considers membership constraints as a deliberate choice
made by states who are founding members of, and have input into the design process of, a new
international organization. By comparing and analyzing founding charters, I find that
democratizing states were more likely to constrain access to membership into these organizations
to regional partners during the Cold War period. I also find that, across time, democracies are
less likely to implement regional membership constraints into the design of the organizations
they create, and that nondemocracies show no preference for or against regional constraints on
membership.
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The second paper in this series considers how power is distributed throughout an
organization and how that power informs the choice of decision-making process within the
organization. How the voting process is designed has the potential to affect member states by
affecting whether actions are taken by the organization or not. I ask what role regime type plays
in these decisions, particularly for democratizing states? I find that, while there are some
valuable takeaways from this question, it seems not to matter much.
The third and final paper in this series examines the inclusion of dispute resolution
mechanisms in international organizations formed by democratizing states and compares that
behavior to that of democracies and autocracies forming new organizations. I find that states of
all regime type are more likely to include dispute resolution mechanisms in economically
oriented organizations, but that regime type is not a significant factor behind this particular
choice among the full range of institutional issue areas.
The existing literature on international cooperation presents evidence that participation in
international organizations can help states undergoing transition from autocracy to democracy
with the difficult process of democratic consolidation. The literature on design makes a
convincing case that design choices are deliberate efforts made by rational acting, self-interested
states to serve those interests. And new evidence suggests that democratizing states behave in a
specific way; they are more likely to form new, rather than join existing international
organizations. But the literature on organizational design choices has not considered whether
democratizing states behave in a unique way during this formation process that would reflect
their unique condition. This project helps to shed some light on that question by examining the
design elements of the charters written by democratizing states and comparing those choices
with those made by democratic actors and by autocratic actors. While not every analysis
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indicates statistically significant differences in behavior, this project serves the collective
literature by providing a jumping-off point to further investigate these choices.
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CHAPTER 2: EXPLAINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEMBERSHIP
CONSTRAINTS AND REGIME TYPE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION DESIGN
1. Introduction
In their 2018 work, “Organizing Democracy: How International Organizations Assist
New Democracies,” Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen present evidence showing that states
undergoing the democratization process are more likely to form new international governmental
organizations (IGOs) than they are to join existing ones. They argue that the reason for this is, in
part, because these new democracies cannot meet the strict accession requirements for accession
into the more established IGOs, but still desire the benefits to be gained from cooperation. While
this work helped scholars of international organizations understand more about how and why
states choose to form new IGOs, it does not address what comes next: issues of institutional
design. Given this, we are presented with an opportunity to build on this finding to explore the
types of choices this particular and unique group of states make while forming new IGOs.
In this paper, I begin this process by analyzing one of the most basic, yet important,
questions states face at the beginning of the institutional design process: who gets in, and who is
left out? The question of membership constraints is one of the most important decisions states
can make when forming a new international governmental organization. I argue that
democratizing states are more likely to restrict membership to include states that are similar to
them by imposing regional constraints. I build on Poast and Urpelainen’s work by comparing the
design choices regarding membership constraints in three categories of IGOs: those created by
democracies, IGOs that were created with zero democratic members (made up mostly of
9

autocracies and perhaps some anocracies), and those IGOs considered by Poast and Urpelainen1
to have been designed by democratizing states.
2.1 Designing IGOs
Scholars studying international organizations and cooperation acknowledge that there is
substantial variation in the way that states design the IGOs they create. However, we still do not
have a complete understanding of why states choose the specific design elements they choose
when creating an IGO, or what effect those design choices have on cooperation. As rational
actors, states choose to form institutions to facilitate cooperation because it is in their best
interest to do so (Koremenos et al., 2001). States then collectively design these institutions
according to those interests that motivated formation to best protect their interests and maximize
the utility of their cooperation within the IGO. Design outcomes are the result of bargaining
processes between and among a group of individual states, and reflect collective decisions
influenced by individual members’ interests and preferences. We can think of these outcomes as
a type of least-common-denominator: what constraints are a majority of states designing the
institution able to agree on without collapsing the prospect of formalized cooperation? This
paper is an attempt to shed some light on the collective choices made by different types of states
when designing new IGOs and the effects of those choices by focusing on IGOs formed by
democratizing states. While individual interests and preferences inform the process, the outcome
of interest, IGO design, is the result of collective action by the groups of states who decided to
form the IGO. This paper considers design decisions to be made by the collective group of

1

A complete list of Poast and Urpelainen’s IGOs can be found in the appendix of this paper, and on pg 6 of

their book, “Organizing Democracy: How International Organizations Assist New Democracies.”
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founding members, though the author acknowledges that these choices are motivated by
individual states’ interests and preferences.
2.2 Democratizing States and IGO Design
Critics of the efficacy of IGOs argue that IGOs are the result of actions states would take
anyway, without the existence of the IGO, because, as self-interested actors, states are looking
for benefits and will do whatever yields them those benefits. IGOs, then, are simply
manifestations of inevitable outcomes. While this may be true, formalizing cooperation into an
international organization structure provides a lot of additional benefits to states that may be
outside of the scope of why the organization was formed in the first place. For example, the
economic benefits of an organization like the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) were the
driving forces behind its creation. The EFTA was created to promote free trade between its
members and to increase economic interactions with what is now the European Union (without
EFTA’s member states having to join the EU to access its market). As with most IGOs, however,
the formalization of cooperation also increases efficiency gains for its members and reduces
transaction costs for its members; they now have access to trade with one another as well as EU
member states without having to negotiate agreements with each of those individual states. There
is also reduced uncertainty because of the clarity provided by formalizing cooperation.
Expectations and rules are set within organizations’ charters, and there is an understanding of the
consequences for non-compliance. All of these are basic benefits of formalized cooperation that
fall outside the initial agenda of simply increasing market access to a group of states (Abbott &
Snidal 1998).
Part of the benefit to forming new IGOs rather than joining existing ones is that creating
new IGOs “allows democratizing states to tailor the IOs to their specific needs” (Poast and

11

Urpelaninen 22). Founding members “can design their own rules for membership and guarantee
their place at the table” (22). Because many of the more lucrative IGOs have high costs to
joining or require new members to have unanimous approval by existing members,
democratizing states are often excluded. Democratizing states often have domestic political and
economic hurdles to overcome to successfully consolidate democracy. Difficult pasts and weak,
or even contradictory, institutions make democratization challenging even when it is desired by
both citizens and the elite. One way that states can improve their chances for successful
democratic transition and consolidation is by garnering support from the international
community, and an efficient way for the international community to provide this support is
through IGOs.
It is also possible for an organization to update its charter’s membership terms, and some,
particularly in Latin America, Africa, and Europe, have later modified their charters to include
“democracy clauses” (Closa and Palestini, 443). Interventions in the violations of democratic
norms by IGOs has happened, despite the IGO not being a security organization. Unión de
Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR), and Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR), both
economic regional organizations in South America, have intervened in domestic challenges to
democracy in member states in the 2010s (Closa and Palestini, 2018). The Southern African
Development Community (SADC), also an economically oriented organization, intervened to
prevent a military coup in Lesotho in 1998, and even the EU sanctioned member-state Austria as
punishment for the violation of democratic principles (Van Der Vleuten and Hoffmann, 2010). In
each of these cases, member states had amended the original charter agreed upon by members at
the time of joining to include democracy clauses, which would allow the organization to
intervene, sanction, punish, or even suspend member’s benefits in the event of a violation of

12

democratic principles. While a quantitative study of the existence of democracy clauses and the
effect of them on cooperation or regime transition is outside the scope of this paper, it is
important to remember that this is an option, as well as an observed practice, of states who have
formed or joined regional organizations, and may inform the choice to limit access to regional
partners who may pose a threat to the process of democratic consolidation.
3.1 Democratizing States and IGO Membership Constraints
This paper incorporates the contributions of some of the fundamental design literature by
taking a rational design approach as presented by Koremenos et al. (2001). They present
membership as one of the five key dimensions within which institutional design is most likely to
vary. Who belongs to an institution is a critical decision. Membership may be exclusive and
restrictive, or it may be inclusive; it could be regional or universal, and it could be restricted to
states only or be open to non-state actors like non-governmental organizations (NGOs). They
also argue that membership restrictions increase as the level of uncertainty regarding member
preferences increases (24). The range of possible options is quite wide, and several of these
options are discussed further in section 3.2 of this paper. Membership rules determine the
distribution of costs and benefits amongst members, and benefits are restricted to those members
who are willing to pay the price of admission (Koremenos et al. 2001). Including or excluding
certain states from membership in newly formed IGOs is one way democratizing states can limit
the influence of other states, especially those states whose interests may conflict with the
democratization process. Membership constraints will depend on the interests and goals of the
members.
This can be a difficult decision, especially when democratizing states must choose to
include or exclude certain powerful members of the international community. For example,
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whether to potentially include the established democracies in their democratization process by
extending IGO membership and influence to these states in particular or to deliberately exclude
them by design. After all, many of these states are forming new organizations because
membership in the more lucrative organizations established and dominated by consolidated (and
powerful) democracies is out of reach (Poast & Urpelainen, 2018). Because the expertise and
resources of advanced democracies can be helpful to democratizing states, democratizing states
may choose to integrate the advanced democracies into their newly formed IGOs as observers or
advisors while at the same time constraining their power over institutional influence. This would
give the democratizing states access to the expertise and resources of the advanced democracies
while limiting their ability to exert too much influence over domestic political and economic
development.
The same goes for autocracies. Democratizing states may face the difficult choice of
excluding autocratic states from the IGOs they design to limit the influence these states may
have over the process through international interactions. In some cases, the democratizing state is
dependent on an autocracy in the region for access to natural resources, economic markets, or
security guarantees. This may be a particularly difficult challenge for former colonies or
integrated republics of the Soviet Union. Patron states, whether democracies or autocracies, often
have an interest in maintaining influence over their former subsidiary states even after those
states have been granted independence and sovereign autonomy.
Membership in an IGO can be a costly signal, and when “membership rules are a
significant hurdle, they say something significant about nonmembers as well” (Koremenos et al.
24). Democratizing states can benefit from working together to overcome a common challenge,
democratic consolidation. Forming an IGO that they get to design guarantees these states a seat
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at the table while excluding less desirable international actors. By designing their own accession
requirements and membership constraints, democratizing states are guaranteed membership in
the new IGO but can also strategically exclude undesirable members (Kaoutzanis et al. 2016).
Cooperation is more likely to be successful when interests are more homogenous,
presenting less opportunity for disagreements or disputes. Many IGOs have membership
restrictions based on geography and are designed to enhance cooperation between members of
specific regional “neighborhoods.” One such IGO is the Organization of American States (OAS),
whose membership is only accessible to, as one might guess based on the organization’s name,
American states. The OAS has 35 member states and includes all 35 independent American
states, the majority of which are in Latin America. The Warsaw Pact, another regional
organization, is a collective security organization that emerged between the Soviet Union and its
satellite republics and allies during the Cold War, extended membership to non-Western,
nondemocracies in an effort to counter the US and European collective security organization,
NATO. This regional organization had both a political and a security orientation, with the goal of
increasing the security of its members against the threat of NATO as well as increasing Soviet
political and economic influence over its fellow communist states.
Membership in regional international organizations can advance the cause of democracy
(Pevehouse, 2005; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008) in those states undergoing regime change.
The constructivist literature investigating the process of international norm development
provides evidence that interactions via international organizations, both governmental and
nongovernmental, can shift domestic preferences, thereby encouraging or reinforcing regime
change (Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Barnett and Finnemore, 2004). It is
reasonable, then, to expect that non-democratic states looking to transition to democracy or those
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which have just begun the democratic consolidation process would find a benefit to regional
organizations and would shape the international organizations they form to reflect such a
constraint.
3.2 Choosing Among Possible Constraint Options
Universal Membership
When states form a new IGO, there are many choices to make and options to choose
from. Membership constraints are no different. States can leave membership open to the entire
international community and offer universal membership. In IGO cases where membership is
universal, any state willing to honor the commitments required of membership may join. This
opens the organization up to every type of state: wealthy or undeveloped; consolidated
democracies, total autocracies, theocracies, monarchies, etc.; those states who protect human
rights and those known as violators; states with domestic resource advantages and states
dependent on those states for those resources; strong and weak military powers; and the list goes
on. The United Nations General Assembly is perhaps the most obvious example of universal
membership. Any sovereign state is eligible to join should they commit to upholding the
organization’s commitments.
Universal membership may generate broad cooperation by bringing in higher numbers of
actors, but there is reason to expect that these high numbers may hinder the depth of cooperation
that may be possible. The reason behind this expectation is many states will prefer to preserve
their sovereignty rather than committing to more constraints on behavior that come with deeper
levels of cooperation. So, depending on the goal of the founding members of the organization,
universal membership may be preferable if cooperation can be garnered with minimal constraints
and there is an incentive to get wider participation across the international community.
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Conversely, if deeper cooperation is necessary to achieve the goals of the organization, then
restricting membership to states who are more interested in making deeper commitments that
demand more extensive constraints on behavior is likely.
Regime-Type Limited Membership
States may choose to limit membership based on regime type. This type of constraint can
be seen in IGOs like the European Union (EU) and NATO, whose members must be
consolidated democracies to join. The EU even has accession plans designed to implement
incremental reforms in effort to help potential members reach this status over time so that they
can meet accession requirements. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union created many “mirror
organizations” that served the same or similar functions to those created by Western powers and
were limited to fellow communist countries and the satellite states of the USSR. States may
prefer to limit based on regime type for several reasons. First, similar regime types likely have
similar values and interests, and this makes cooperation easier. Secondly, states may prefer to
form certain types of organizations with states who share similar values because cooperation
generates benefits that may increase a state’s power. Scholarship shows that democracies are
more likely to trade and to ally with other democracies, in part because of the shared liberal
values.
Sates may also choose to limit membership based on regime type with the goal of
keeping bad actors out. Some autocracies may prefer to exclude democracies for similar reasons.
International interactions between democracies and autocracies often result in a change in
autocratic behavior to look more democratic (Mitchell, 2002). Interacting with democracies
through international organizations also socializes autocracies and can spur regime change
(Pevehouse, 2005; Pevehouse and Russett, 2006; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008) as mentioned
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earlier. Many autocracies have policies that limit international interaction in order to insulate
their spheres of influence and keep democratic norm diffusion from penetrating their borders.
Limiting membership into IGOs by regime type is a good way to insulate one’s domestic
territory from outside influence of ideologically opposed regimes.
Membership Limited by State Capacity
Because cooperation through international organizations seeks to distribute the costs and
the benefits derived from cooperation, some states may choose to limit membership to only
states with the capacity to contribute as equally as possible to the costs. By limiting by capacity,
states who may not be able to carry their own weight or will receive outsized benefits relative to
their contribution can be excluded. Two of the IGOs from the example above, the EU and
NATO, also have limitations on membership based in some way on capacity to contribute. To
join the EU, and particularly the EU’s monetary regime, the Eurozone, a state must have a
reasonably developed and stable economy to support the currency. Prospective members of
NATO must commit a certain percentage (2%) of their total GDP to military spending and must
have a military capable of participating in joint training exercises with other members. This is a
considerable burden for some of the EU and NATO’s newer, formerly communist, members,
who are still working on fortifying their domestic economic institutions. Limiting membership
access to those states with the capacity to contribute equitably to the organization is one of the
ways states can ensure that the cost-benefit analysis of membership makes sense for states who
join.
Resource or Commodity-Based Membership
Some IGOs focus on a particular resource, and limit membership to only
producing/exporting or importing countries. This is especially relevant to IGOs focusing on
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commodities, like precious metals, oil and gas, or even agricultural crops like coffee. These types
of agreements can help protect the interests of those states who depend the most on the
production and sale of commodities, as well as increasing trade between exporters and importers.
Not all resource-focused organizations are open to both producers or exporters and importers.
Some are limited only to producer countries, such as the Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries, or OPEC. Cooperation through this organization helps this unique group of
states coordinate on prices and production levels as well as policy, and it affects petroleum prices
internationally. Member states are located across the globe, with members in the Middle East,
Asia, Africa, and South America. By focusing on the interests of petroleum exporting countries,
OPEC can increase efficiency and reduce transaction costs for its members.
Regional or Geographic Membership
Another constraint on membership that we see frequently in international organization
design is geographic, and limits membership to those states located in a particular geographic
region. As this specific membership constraint is the focus of my analysis, I will discuss in in
greater detail in the following section.
3.3 Regional Organizations and Democratization
States are more likely to interact with, trade with, ally with, and even fight with,
neighbors, mostly due to proximity and convenience, but also because neighboring states are
often, to some degree, similar. Culture, language, resources, and interests tend to cluster, so it
makes sense that political regimes would likewise share some similarities when borders are
shared, or states are in the same geographical region. Scholars of regime change have recognized
that the event tends to cluster regionally, likely due to a “context of diffusion and container of
primary external factors and interactions influencing changes in political authority structures.
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Geography and distance induce dependence and affectedness, and shape incentives and behavior
among neighboring countries” (Gleditsch, 1). Countries are more likely to democratize when
their neighbors experience democratization. The probability that an autocracy will experience a
democratic regime change is sharply increased as the proportions of democratic neighbors
increases (Gleditsch and Ward, 2006). This is possibly due to several factors; diffusion across
borders is more likely than diffusion across oceans, but also because the more autocrats watch
states that have democratized experience benefits with lower-than-expected costs or have seen
instances where elites were able to retain power throughout the transition, the less resistant they
may become to democratic reforms.
As mentioned earlier, there is also evidence suggesting that interacting with democracies
makes autocrats act more democratic – at least during these interactions (Mitchell, 2002). Within
the context of cooperation through a formalized organization, Pevehouse (2005) argues that
autocracies participating in more democratically dense IGOs are more likely to undergo a
democratic regime change than those either not in these types of IGOs or in less democratically
dense ones. Participation in IGOs can create pressure for autocrats to liberalize and can lower the
risks they face when doing so. Regional organizations may be better equipped to not only assist
their members through the democratic consolidation process but also to apply pressure to
nondemocratic neighboring regimes through the promise of access to the benefits of membership
in exchange for domestic reforms.
Because regional IGOs have fewer members than large universal ones, they have the
capacity to monitor the behavior of their members and to keep better tabs on external conditions
that may affect their members. This alleviates the sanctioning problem, allowing members to
identify states not upholding their commitments and apply sanctions or offer incentives to
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compel compliance with the terms of membership (Drezner, 2000; Hawkins et al. 2006;
Mansfield & Pevehouse, 2008; Abbott & Snidal, 2013). These IGOs also tend to have higher
levels of interaction between members, creating opportunities for “socialization, binding,
monitoring, and enforcement” (Pevehouse, 2002, 520). This quality also helps young
democracies consolidate their newly implemented reforms through hands-tying and resource
transfers, thereby constraining the actions of member states and encouraging behavioral change.
Regional organizations may be able to affect regime change or consolidation without
explicit regime-type-related constraints in their charters. This is another reason democratizing or
newly democratized states may choose to limit cooperation regionally rather than excluding
potential members based on regime type. There is evidence that authoritarian governments have
used regional cooperation as a geopolitical strategy to influence the behavior of neighboring
states. Participation in regional organizations through repeated interactions between and among
members encourages learning and socialization – this is not a phenomenon exclusive to
democracies or democratically dense IGOs. Cooperation through IGOs also reveals information
via repeated iteration. As states have more cooperative interactions states have through an IGO,
transparency is increased. IGOs spearheaded by autocracies can also encourage learning, as well
as “provide economic and military support to autocracies, increase the legitimacy of
authoritarian regimes, or reduce the pressure to democratize by providing a viable alternative to
cooperating with democratic states and developing their own sets of rules and norms” (Libman
and Obydenkova, 1037-1038). So, we see the same mechanisms at work which are encouraging
democratization or democratic consolidation in democratically dense organizations also working
to reinforce authoritarianism in autocracies through autocratically dense organizations. By not
excluding neighborhood autocracies from participation in their IGOs, new democracies are able
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to offer the benefits of cooperation while monitoring the behavior of these states that are
potentially problematic to the process of democratic consolidation. Regional organizations can
offer “carrots” by way of economic benefits to weaker neighborhood states, and these benefits
may act as a deterrent to states who may otherwise actively resist democratization in their
neighborhood for fear of spillover effects.
There is also a stabilizing effect to integrating autocracies into a network of regional
cooperative institutions. Mazumder (2017) finds that as autocracies become more embedded into
liberal institutions such as preferential trade agreements, they become less likely to initiate
conflict. We know that conflict is more likely between regional actors and especially contiguous
actors. By allowing autocratic regimes to participate in regional organizations, fragile new
democracies mitigate the likelihood of an attack by an authoritarian neighbor which would have
devastating effects of the prospect of democratic consolidation. The focus of this paper is
international organization design, not conflict initiation, but avoiding conflict is a central concern
for all states, especially new democracies. If integrating neighbors who may be less than thrilled
with their recent regime change can reduce the likelihood for aggressive action by these
neighbors, then it is important to consider as a motivating factor of design.
Formalized cooperation is also a way to tie hands. Pevehouse (2005) notes that leaders of
transitional regimes may join IGOs as a way to legitimize the regime, to increase credibility, and
to tie one’s own hands in an effort to implement difficult reforms necessary for democratic
transition and consolidation. This mechanism can also work to tie neighborhood authoritarians’
hands and can explain why democratizing or newly democratized states may not want to actively
exclude potentially problematic neighbors from their newly formed IGOs. It can be a way for
those states to tie the hands of actors who may otherwise meddle in the transition process. This
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can also help to influence those neighbors to eventually democratize as well. Nygård (2015)
argues that this is indeed the case, and those autocratic regimes who are more reluctant to
liberalize are less likely to even join IGOs that would encourage those types of reforms (406).
Leaving membership open to regional actors regardless of regime type may also signal to the
neighborhood who is most likely to resist the democratization process.
4.1 Hypothesis: Democratizing states are likely to include regional constraints on the
membership eligibility in IGOs they are founding members of and for which they have input into
the design process.
As the literature and the preceding discussion demonstrates, IGOs come in all different
shapes and sizes, from universal organizations open to all or nearly all states, like the United
Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Health Organization, to those limited
by region, like the European Union and the Arab League. Some IGOs are limited by interest, like
the International Coffee Organization and the International Tropical Timber Organization, and
others still are limited by regime type, like the European Union. Some have multiple constraints,
such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, both of which
were limited by interests, region, and regime type. Membership constraints put limitations on
what states are eligible for membership into the organization (or who may even be interested in
joining) and may be able to enjoy the benefits of cooperation through the organization. There are
many reasons why states may want to include membership eligibility constraints in their
founding rules, but the main reason is to protect the interests of the members. In the example
used above addressing IGOs limited by regime type, the Warsaw Pact was a security
organization formed by the Soviet Union and its satellite states in response to the formation of
NATO to protect its members from any aggression or influence by the West. Conversely, NATO
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was founded in response to the threat of Soviet aggression and influence on Western Europe’s
borders. The US and its allies in Western Europe wanted a security organization that was
founded on democratic principles, and no prospective member that is not a consolidated
democracy will be granted accession.
These IGOs were not only limited by regime type, but they were also limited by region.
The Warsaw Pact was made up of states located in Eastern Europe that were in the Soviet Union;
NATO includes only North Atlantic states – those geographically located in North America,
Europe, or, in the case of Turkey, strategically bordering Europe. By limiting membership to
regionally proximate states, the focus of the organization can be specialized and interactions with
similar partners can be maximized. There is also a more homogenous set of interests in these
regionally concentrated groups of states which makes cooperation easier and less costly.
Kaoutzanis et al. argue that strict constraints on member states by democratizing states
serves the purpose of keeping “bad apples” out (2016), and I agree. However, I argue that this
creates an opportunity for the “good apples.” Those democratizing or recently democratized
states forming the IGOs that Poast and Urpelainen, and now I, here, focus on, can design the
organizations however they prefer. Placing regional constraints on membership invites actors in
the immediate neighborhood in and gives democratizing states the change to set an agenda that
serves their interests in protecting their new regime. It also encourages socialization with
neighboring autocrats. Additionally, it gives the young democracies a chance to constrain the
behavior of neighborhood autocrats and set expectations for future action. With “good apples”
setting the agenda and making the rules for the neighborhood, autocrats will have to act
accordingly so that they receive the benefits of cooperation generated by these IGOs, or they can
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remain outside the club and have marginal influence over their newly democratic or
democratizing neighbors.
4.2 Research Design
I have assembled a new dataset compiled of measurements of certain design elements of
interest so that I may test my hypothesis. The unit of analysis for the tests run in this
investigation is the year of IGO formation (IGO-year) of three different categories of IGOs. This
investigation limits the sample to IGO-year of IGO formation to parse out the effect of
democratization on the likelihood that certain membership choices are made by groups of these
states at the time of IGO formation. The main dependent variable is Regional Constraints, the
key independent variable is the regime type of the founding membership of the IGO, and each
model includes several controls. More on the construction and operationalization of these
variables is discussed in sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 of this paper.
My goal with this research is to compare the design choices within IGOs formed by
different sets of states. Specifically, I look at how groups of democratizing states make those
design choices as compared to the choices made by groups of states with a majority of founding
members having either democratic or nondemocratic regime types when they form new IGOs.
To do this systematically, I begin with the list of IGOs identified by Poast and Urpelainen (2018)
as being founded by democratizing states. There are twenty-seven IGOs included in this data2. I
then draw from the latest version (v3) of Intergovernmental Organizations data (Pevehouse et al.
2019) housed within the Correlates of War (COW) database and identify organizations founded
by democratic states and by autocratic states. The IGOs in this dataset are coded according to
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One of the IGOs identified by Poast and Urpelainen as being founded by democratizing states, the Baltic

Environmental Forum, is not included in the COW IGO data, so I dropped it from this new dataset. A complete
list of the IGOs included in the data can be found in the Appendix to this paper in Table 5.
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mandate: social, political, and economic. I use the COW IGO data to first identify the mandate of
each IGO from Poast and Urpelainen to ensure that I am comparing these organizations with
similar ones. I was able to find the original founding charter for twenty-one of these IGOs, and
these are the IGOs I analyze and include in this dataset and analysis; the makeup of this group by
mandate is such: twelve economic organizations, seven political organizations, and two social
organizations.
Next, using the data in IGO-country-year format that included only founding member
states, I identified a comparable distribution across IGO mandates founded by a majority of
democratic states and IGOs founded by a majority nondemocratic group of states. To do this, I
use the founding member states’ Polity scores at the time of IGO creation, considering states
with a Polity score greater than or equal to seven to be consolidated democracies, those with
Polity scores less than or equal to negative seven to be consolidated autocracies, and those with a
score of less than seven but greater than negative seven to be anocracies. I then calculate the
democratic, anocratic, or autocratic density of each organization in the COW IGO dataset so that
I may identify those IGOs that are majority democratic or majority nondemocratic; meaning that
at least 51% of founding members met the democratic or nondemocratic threshold discussed
above. My goal was to build a dataset that would represent the greatest likelihood of specific
design elements being preferred by collective groups of states made up of a particular regime
type. To do this, I identified those organizations whose founding members were 51+%
democracies and then whose founders included 51+% nondemocracies. I then randomly chose
organizations that had five or more founding members from each mandate category to
correspond with the number of IGOs from each mandate category identified by Poast and
Urpelainen.
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The criteria for choosing a particular IGO: being founded by at least five states, a
majority of whom shared a similar regime type, is more stringent that the criteria used by Poast
and Urpelainen to identify IGOs founded by democratizing states. The IGOs they include in their
analysis upon which I am building this research are IGOs whose founding membership was
made up of at least twenty-five percent new democracies. I set the bar high for a couple of
important reasons. First, bargaining over the terms of agreements becomes more difficult as the
number of actors at the bargaining table increases. Five or more sovereign states coming together
to form a formal international governmental organization requires more actors to bargain over
allowances and constraints, ensuring that the design decisions likely did not come too easily. The
types of constraints on behavior that are built into an agreement may incrementally increase
participation costs by way of decreasing sovereignty.
I also required 51+% of the founding members to be of similar regime type so I may
make a reasonable assumption that these actors have generally similar interests, and that the
design choices made by these actors will reflect these interests. Although Poast and Urpelainen
use a much lower threshold in their consideration of IGOs founded by democratizing states, I
chose to use a higher threshold to increase the confidence of my comparisons.
To generate the IGO-year format of the final dataset used in this analysis, I collapsed the
data to reflect the design choices made by the collective group of founding member states in the
year the IGO was created. Each observation is an IGO in its founding year.
4.3 Dependent Variable: Membership Constraints
Who is allowed in and who is purposefully kept out are important choices for states to
make when forming an international governmental organization, and this element is the focus of
my analysis. This paper represents a first-pass investigation of the decisions made by
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democratizing states when forming new IGOs as compared to democratic or non-democratic
states. For this reason, I keep the delineation among types of constraints generally simple. To
create this variable, I created a dichotomous variable indicating whether an IGO restricts
membership to regional actors only or not. The category of interest in this analysis is “Regional
Constraints.” For any IGO with a 1 for the original membership constraint variable, a 1 is
assigned for the variable labeled “Regional IGO,” and a 0 otherwise. This dichotomous coding
system indicates that, out of the 73 IGOs in the dataset, 36 have regional membership constraints
and 37 do not. A complete breakdown of the distribution by IGO regime type can be found in
Table 2.1.
It is possible that an organization is regional in nature and is comprised of states
geographically located in the same region, but no explicit regional limitations are expressed in
the charter. In these cases, despite membership being functionally regional, the organization is
coded as a 0 since the charter includes no legal limitations to membership access. One example
of a case like this that is included in my analysis as an IGO founded by democratizing states is
the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA). The organization was founded in 1991
by Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Hungary, and has since included Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia,
Kosovo, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Not each of these states remain current members but
have been members at one point or another. This organization has often been considered a
stepping-stone for European Union (EU) membership, and those states who have been previous
members of CEFTA but have exited the organization did so upon accession to the EU. It has
always included states located in Europe and who have expressed a commitment to
implementing liberal democratic political and economic reforms, but membership is not
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expressly constrained according to geographic limitations, regime type, capacity, or in any other
way (CEFTA Agreement 1992).
Regime Category

Regional Constraints

No Regional Constraints

Total

Democratizing*

14

7

21

Majority Democratic

7

19

26

Majority Nondemocratic

15

11

26

Total

36

37

73

Table 2.1: Membership Constraints by Regime Type Summary Statistics
*Based on Poast & Urpelainen 2018

4.4 Key Independent Variable: Regime Type of IGO Founding Membership
The primary independent variable in this analysis represents a measure of the regime type
of the IGO by identifying the IGOs in the dataset as being founded by a majority of democratic
actors or a majority of non-democratic actors. This was done by calculating the democratic
density (Pevehouse, 2002) of each organization based on the regime type of its founding
members in the first year of the organization according to Polity2 scores, and then coding the
organizations as democratic (1), anocratic (2), or autocratic (3). This process was described in
more depth earlier in section 4.2 of this paper. I then assigned a dichotomous designation of
democratic (1 if more than half of the founding members were democracies, 0 otherwise) or
nondemocratic (1 if more than half of the founding members were nondemocracies, including
both anocracies and autocracies, 0 if otherwise) to each IGO.
The distribution of this variable is wide, ranging from 0% to 100%. Of all 73 IGOs in the
dataset, 15 are made up of zero democracies. Thirty of them are made up of 25% or less
democratic members and 38 have less than 50% democratic members. Thirty-five IGOs are
made up of 50% or more democratic members, 24 have more than 75% democratic members,
and seven are made up of 100% democracies. The full distribution can be found in figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of IGOs by Democratic Density

4.5 Control Variables
Following Kaoutzanis et al. (2015), who build on Mansfield and Pevehouse’s (2008)
work on the relationship between democratization and IGO formation, I include several control
variables to account for different iterations of that relationship. I created a variable called
Communist Bloc Member, and states which were previously under a communist regime, either
as part of the Soviet Union, the Eastern Bloc, or the Asian and African states within the Soviet
sphere of influence through formal or informal arrangements are coded as 13. I then calculate the
former communist density, and, in the final collapsed dataset, those IGOs which were founded
by at least fifty percent former communist bloc states are coded as 1, others as 0. When the
Soviet Union collapsed, the IGOs they created also died, and many of the states in the former
Soviet bloc began creating their own new IGOs with the express intent to exclude Russia from
membership. Often, states undertook this action to protect their newfound independence and to
minimize Russian influence in the states’ process of setting up new governments, many of which
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A full list of these states can be found in Table 6.1 in the appendix of this paper.
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aimed to be democratic. Similarly, I include a Cold War indicator to identify global and
temporally related behavioral trends of East-versus-West ideological opposition. During the Cold
War, the major powers and their allies promoted the ideologically driven choosing of sides and
encouraged deeper integration based on those choices. The years 1947 through 1991 are coded 1
to indicate that these IGO formation events were taking place during the Cold War, and 0 for
those years after 1991.
Because neighbors are more likely to trade with one another and to enter into economic
agreements, and because the majority of IGOs in my sample are economically oriented, I include
a control for economic IGOs. This measure is dichotomous and comes straight from the COW
IGO v.3 data (Pevehouse et al 2019) and is coded as a 1 if the organization is considered to have
an economic mandate and 0 otherwise.
5 Results
To test my hypothesis: Democratizing states are likely to include regional constraints on
the membership eligibility in IGOs they are founding members of and have input into the design
process, I run several models and present the results below. I do not only run tests on the main
independent variable of interest: IGOs founded by democratizing states4, but I also run analyses
considering IGOs whose founders were mostly democracies5 and those whose founders were
mostly nondemocracies6. These additional tests allow us to understand how IGOs designed by
different types of members may or may not vary and provides insight into the outcome of
bargaining processes by actors of different regime type.

4

These are IGOs identified by Poast & Urpelainen (2018) to have been founded by democratizing or recently
democratized states.
5
IGOs considered “democratic” for the purpose of this analysis were founded by at least 50.01% consolidated
democracies, meaning that the state, at the time of founding, had a Polity2 score equal to or greater than 7.
6
IGOs considered “nondemocratic” for the purpose of this analysis were founded less than 50.0% consolidated
democracies, meaning that the state, at the time of founding, had a Polity2 score equal to or greater than 7.
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5.1 Models 1 through 1.3
To directly test the probability that an IGO formed by democratizing states would choose
to include regional constraints on membership during the design process, I first run a bivariate
logistic regression using the dichotomous dependent variable indicating that an IGO’s charter
limits membership access regionally, and the dichotomous independent variable indicating
whether a particular IGO in my sample was formed by democratizing states as identified by
Poast & Urpelainen (2018) or not. The coefficient results can be found in table 2.2, Model 1.
While the results are not statistically significant, they do indicate a positive relationship between
the dependent and independent variables. This test was conducted without controls.
I then conduct the similar tests three more times, each controlling for a few different
factors discussed above. Communist density represents the density of communist members in the
founding membership relative to total members, expressed as a percentage. Cold War is a
dichotomous measure indicating whether the IGO was formed during the Cold War period,
coded 1 for the years 1945-1990 and 0 for all years after and including 1991. The third control,
isolated in model 1.2 and included in a complete model with all controls in model 1.3, is an
indication measuring whether the IGOs in the analysis are economic. As shown in the results in
table 2.1, models 1.1 and 1.3, the probability of IGOs formed by democratizing states to include
regional constraints on membership is positive and statistically significant at a level less than
0.05% when controlling for the Cold War. This indicates that those IGOs founded during the
Cold War are statistically significantly more likely to include regional constraints to membership
than those founded following the Cold War period. Whether the IGO has an economic
orientation does not significantly affect the probability of limiting membership access to regional
partners only.
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Because meaningful inference outside of sign and significance is impossible if we rely
solely on the coefficients derived from a logistic regression, I include graphs illustrating the
predicted probabilities for each model as well. As seen in figure 2.2 representing Model 1,
democratizing states are likely to include regional constraints in the IGOs they design, but
because the confidence bands overlap the intercepts, these results are statistically insignificant.
Figure 2.3 representing Model 1.1 indicates a higher and statistically significant probability that
those IGOs formed by democratizing states will include regional constraints on membership, as
the confidence bands are tighter and do not overlap the intercepts. Figure 2.4 represents Model
1.2 and Figure 2.5 represents Model 1.3. Similar to Figure 2.3, Figure 2.4 has wide and
overlapping confidence bands demonstrating that the effect of economic orientation of an IGO is
insignificant.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the fully specified model, that democratizing states are more likely
to form IGOs with regional membership constraints, and this is significantly more likely in the
period during the Cold War. This is expected, as the East-versus-West ideologically oriented
Cold War period saw the creation of many IGOs by the West in effort to encourage cooperation
among ideologically like-minded actors, and it saw the creation of many “mirror organizations”
by the Soviet Union to do the same with their satellite states and fellow Communist
governments. This warrants further investigation, as this set of IGOs, being founded by
democratizing states, may prefer to include regional constraints as a way to increase cooperation
with like-minded neighbors with the goal of affecting or protecting the democratic consolidation
process. Though an investigation of this nature is outside the scope of this paper, it presents a
rich opportunity for further research into these organizations and their role in the democratic
consolidation process.
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To understand potential differences in the IGO founding behaviors of
democratizing states and those of states of different regime types, and to make meaningful
comparisons between these groups of IGOs, I conduct the same types of tests for IGOs that are
made up mostly of democracies and those made up mostly of nondemocracies. Models 2 and 2.1
consider “Democratic IGOs” and Models 3 and 3.1 consider “Nondemocratic IGOs,” and can be
found in the following two sections.
Table 2.2
Variables
Poast & Urpelainen IGO

Model 1
Regional IGO

Model 1.1
Regional IGO

Model 1.2
Regional IGO

Model 1.3
Regional IGO

0.796
(0.530)

1.576**
(0.704)
0.00301
(0.00956)
1.620**
(0.744)

0.799
(0.530)

1.574**
(0.705)
0.00233
(0.00981)
1.619**
(0.742)
-0.155
(0.514)
-1.699**
(0.827)
73

Communist Density
Cold War
Economic IGO
Constant
Observations

-0.310
(0.281)

-1.797**
(0.765)

-0.161
(0.480)
-0.221
(0.386)

73

73

73

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 2.2

Figure 2.3
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Figure 2.4

Figure 2.5

5.2 Models 2 through 2.3
As seen in Table 2.3, those IGOs formed by mostly democracies are less likely to include
regional constraints in the membership limitations of the IGOs they form, as indicated by the
negative coefficient, and this probability is highly statistically significant at a level less than
0.01. This holds true when I control for the factors used in the previous test: Communist Density,
whether the IGO was formed during the Cold War or not, and the economic nature of the IGO
mandate. This should not come as a surprise, as we know that democratic states are more likely
to trade with and ally with other democracies, so we should expect to see a greater likelihood that
democracies would form IGOs with other democracies with less regard for whether those
democracies are geographically proximate.
The predicted probabilities graphs illustrate the results and can be found in the figures
below (figures 2.6-2.9). Each model indicates a negative probability of including regional
constraints on access to IGO membership, and in each case the confidence bands do not overlap
the intercept, indicating statistical significance.
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Table 2.3
Variable
Democratic IGO

Model 2
Regional IGO

Model 2.1
Regional IGO

Model 2.2
Regional IGO

Model 2.3
Regional IGO

-1.386***
(0.533)

-1.514***
(0.555)
-0.00545
(0.00961)
0.941
(0.601)

-1.385***
(0.533)

-1.521***
(0.557)
-0.00642
(0.00989)
0.942
(0.601)
-0.214
(0.524)
-0.0850
(0.640)
73

Communist Density
Cold War
Economic IGO
Constant

Observations

0.388
(0.297)

-0.220
(0.550)

-0.130
(0.497)
0.460
(0.407)

73

73

73

Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 2.6

Figure 2.7

Figure 2.8

Figure 2.9
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5.3 Models 3 through 3.3
The results from the analysis of IGOs founded by nondemocratic states are all
statistically insignificant. As the coefficient table for Models 3 through 3.3 shows (Table 2.4),
these IGOs are likely to include regional constraints on membership access in their design
process, however, the positive coefficients are not significant. Figures 2.10 through 2.13
illustrating the predicted probabilities of these groups of states choosing regional constraints each
show wide and overlapping confidence bands, so while the relationship is positive, it is
essentially meaningless.
Table 2.4
Variables
Nondemocratic IGO

Model 3
Regional IGO

Model 3.1
Regional IGO

Model 3.2
Regional IGO

Model 3.3
Regional IGO

0.610
(0.495)

0.470
(0.564)
-0.00299
(0.00997)
0.620
(0.609)

0.606
(0.495)

0.479
(0.565)
-0.00382
(0.0102)
0.620
(0.609)
-0.184
(0.494)
-0.580
(0.587)

Communist Density
Cold War
Economic IGO
Constant
Observations

-0.300
(0.295)

-0.689
(0.510)

-0.129
(0.477)
-0.226
(0.401)

73
73
73
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 2.10

Figure 2.11
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73

Figure 2.12

Figure 2.13

6 Conclusion
The design choices made by states forming a new IGO are the result of bargaining
processes, and represent a least common denominator outcome: what constraints are all or most
of the actors willing to agree to and abide by? Who is kept out and who is let in is a decision that
can have real consequences for the entire organization, from the distribution of costs and benefits
to where power sits within the organization. Membership constraints are an easy way for states to
limit access to and influence within the organizations they form.
There are three valuable takeaways from this analysis. First, democratizing states were
more likely to include regional constraints to membership access in the design of the IGOs they
formed during the Cold War period than afterwards. Explanations as to why this is the case is
outside the scope of this paper but presents interesting opportunities for future research. Second,
IGOs formed by democracies are less likely to include regionally oriented constraints to
membership access, and this may be because democracies are more likely to cooperate with
other democracies on various issues than they are to cooperate with nondemocratic actors. And
third, there is no evidence that nondemocracies prefer regional constraints to membership in the
IGOs they form, regardless of the time period or the mandate of the organization.
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This analysis is a first pass at understanding the design choices that collective groups
made up of states with different regime types may prefer. This comparison of seventy-three
charters designed by three different groups of founding members: democratizing states,
democracies, and nondemocracies, has provided broad insight into how preferences based on
regime type vary. Democratizing states seem to prefer regional constraints, but this preference is
statistically insignificant until controls representing communist density, the Cold War period,
and total number of IGOs in the international system were included. Democracies are unlikely to
include regional constraints on access to membership in the IGOs they form, and this probability
is statistically significant in both the bivariate regression and when controls were added.
Nondemocracies are likely to include regional constraints, but this probability is also
insignificant in both bivariate and controlled test.
Participation in international cooperation can provide states with many benefits they may
otherwise have zero or limited access to. Integration into international organizations can also
help with the transition and consolidation process for states undergoing democratization
(Pevehouse, 2006; Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2008; Kaoutzanis et al. 2015). Design mechanisms
dictating the nature and process of formalized cooperation affect the outcome of cooperation, and
scholars are still learning how and to what extent these mechanisms function. This analysis
provides a snapshot of the variation in one specific, though important, choice regarding
membership constraints based on who is making those choices. It also provides a jumping-off
point for further exploration into the study of IGO design and membership choices, specifically,
by compiling a new dataset measuring design mechanisms chosen by groups of states made up of
varying regime types.
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CHAPTER 3: EXPLAINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VOTING RULES AND
REGIME TYPE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION DESIGN

1. Introduction
Scholars of international cooperation and formalized intergovernmental organizations
(IGOs) understand that these institutions emerge from a basic place of need: states identify a set
of actors with similar interests who may be willing to share the costs and the benefits of
cooperation to meet their needs. Formalizing cooperation helps distribute costs and benefits, it
reduces uncertainty, and manages expectations. It also increases efficiency and reduces
transaction costs. What makes IGOs interesting to study is that not all IGOs look the same. There
is substantial variation across many dimensions, including mandate, membership restrictions,
power distribution, and design, just to name a few. Even a quick glance at the data suggests that
there is also extensive variation in the choices states make when designing these institutions, and
a lot of that decision-making process is not clearly understood.
This paper contributes to the cooperation and design literatures by building on evidence
presented by Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen (2018) indicating that democratizing states are
more likely to form new IGOs than they are to join existing ones, as the accession criteria to join
many of the most established IGOs is simply out of reach for this unique subset of states. With
this paper, I continue my analysis of institutional design choices by considering how power is
distributed among actors at the inception of the organization. I do this by considering how the
founders decide to formalize how the decision-making body of the IGO takes action via voting
rules
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I argue that democratizing states that participate in forming new IGOs will prefer voting
rules that allow decisions to be made by a majority, rather than consensus or unanimity. The
reason for this expectation is that consensus or unanimous requirements give states veto power,
thus constraining the ability of the organization to provide assistance and resources to these
states. One or two actors experiencing domestic audience pushback relating to democratic
reforms or international policy may be able to effectively stop action at the IGO level, thereby
affecting all members. We know that liberalization can be a difficult process domestically but
getting over the initial hump is critical to democratic consolidation. IGOs can help with this
process (Closa and Palestini, 2018; Pevehouse, 2002 & 2006; Poast and Urpelainen, 2018). If the
IGO is prevented from undertaking its mandate because of an objection by one or two members,
consolidation may be threatened and the IGO may not be able to fulfill its purpose.
2. State Interests and IGO Design
International cooperation has a long and storied history, going back hundreds of years. The
1648 Peace of Westphalia established the idea of state sovereignty and free and equal nations; no
actor was above the state. The international system is one of self-help, and cooperation or
conflict is up to each individual actor in the system. Fast forward nearly 200 years and we arrive
at the Congress of Vienna, where the Concert of Europe was established by the great powers in
response to Napoleon’s France, and a decision was made that no one power should become so
dominant again because the cost of war was too great (Langhorne, 1986). In the years following,
the international system saw the establishment of some of the first formal international
governmental organizations. These organizations arose from a need to standardize actions among
sovereign states in the interest of increasing efficiency and gave states a forum to discuss ideas
aimed at facing international challenges. In the early 1800s, European economic development
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depended on increased trade through shipping, compelling those states sharing access to critical
shipping avenues to coordinate policies regarding that access. A need quickly arose to regulate
movement on the Rhine River (and eventually the Danube River) to facilitate international
shipping and travel between the countries through which these rivers run more efficiently and
effectively. The Central Commission for Rhine Navigation emerged and became “the sole
international agency charged with administration of the Rhine,” (Collinson, 1972). In 1865, the
International Telegraph Union, was created as the result of a conference of twenty European
state representatives meeting in an effort to organize telegraph networks across Europe
(Codding, Jr. 1995). A year later the organization created the first permanent secretariat in an
international organization, ushering in a new model of formalized interstate cooperation Europe.
Decisions made within these early organizations tended to be made by voting, either by
majority rule or by weighted voting. About 13 percent of their decisions were made “without
official oversight by the member states” (Zweifel 2005, 56-57). The nature of international
cooperation was shifting to becoming more formalized, thought these rules were not always
necessarily written into the founding charters. When voting rules were written into the League of
Nations Charter following the devastation of World War I, each state was given one vote. Votes
were to be taken in public, creating an international forum for discussion, problem solving, and
information sharing, thus reducing uncertainty and transaction costs. This still did not solve the
problem of conflict through international cooperation, as many of the powerful states refused to
participate in the League because of the inequitable distribution of power within the
organization, resulting in its failure.
We know that states care very much about design, and that the way an institution is
designed can affect not only outcomes, but even the IGO’s very viability. For example,
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following the failure of the League of Nations, where each member state had one equal vote, the
international community knew it needed to come together through formal institutionalized
cooperation if another catastrophic international conflict was to be avoided. However, much of
the failure of the League of Nations could be attributed to design flaws, namely the
aforementioned “one state, one vote” distribution of power that did not reflect the true state of
the world. This was also a major contributing factor resulting in the United States’ refusal to
officially join the organization.
The subsequent organization, the United Nations (UN), was designed (after extensive
back-and-forth among its founders) with this particular design flaw in mind. The resulting
solution, the creation of two separate organs: the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and
the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), was the answer to this asymmetric distribution
of power. All members of the UN would hold one seat in the UNGA, and each member would
have one equal vote. States like Great Britain, Russia, and the United States would have one vote
equal to the votes of states like Namibia, Guatemala, and Qatar. This design mechanism reflected
the equality of sovereignty among members and allowed even smaller, less powerful states to
weigh in on matters of international concern. The global power distribution would be represented
at the UNSC level where the five great powers were given permanent seats with veto power.
Great Britain, the United States, France, Russia, and China would always sit at the UNSC table,
along with rotating members from several geographic regions who would each have one vote but
not a veto. The UNSC decides matters of international peace and security, and the issue of
international conflict is frequently on the agenda. Without this particular design guaranteeing
that their interests would always be loudly represented (via the permanent status of their seats)
and fiercely protected (via veto power allowing each major power to unilaterally block actions),
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the major powers likely would not have joined the UN. The design of the organization was
critical to membership considerations and has had a lasting effect on the outcomes produced by
the organization since its inception.
Critics of formal IGOs argue that IGOs are the manifestations of inevitable outcomes: the
results of actions that states would take based on the yield of benefits to be had from cooperation.
This may be true to some degree, but many benefits may result from formalizing cooperation in
the form of an IGO, and one important issue for states participating in interstate cooperation is
the protection of their own interests.
3. What Do We Know About IGOs and Voting Rules?
The implementation of voting rules in the design of IGOs is important to understand
because this is the way decisions are made by organizations on behalf of their member states.
Koremenos, et al. (2001) include some iteration of voting and decision-making rules in their
foundational design analysis because these rules affect control within the organization. These
rules are chosen by states based on several variables including distribution problems,
enforcement problems, how many actors are participating and how asymmetrically power is
distributed among them, and problems of uncertainty, both about the state of the world and about
preferences of individual actors (Koremenos et al. 13). They argue that some of the most
palpable effects on voting rules come from an attempt to mitigate three potential problems. First,
as more members join the institution, individual control decreases. Members may want to protect
individual levels of control through voting rules that favor them. Second, real-world power
asymmetries within the organization may not be reflected with equitable voting distributions.
And third, uncertainty about the state of the world will result in members’ desire for more
control to block undesirable outcomes (31-33). To further complicate matters, Michael and
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Schories (2019) find that the lower the accession costs to membership, the higher the risk of
uncertainty due to the potential for unproductive members. While an analysis of membership
costs is outside the scope of this paper, it is important to remember that there are often members
of organizations who will present problems to the cooperative process and that uncertainty will
inform the design process, including the question of voting.
How states view these problems and attempt to solve them in the context of IGO design
is the driver behind much of the voting literature. It becomes obvious when reviewing these
extensive works that we still have much to understand about how and why particular choices are
made. States want to encourage participation within the organization, to allow members to make
efficient and effective decisions while protecting individual interests (Posner and Sykes, 2014).
These decisions are rarely ideal, however, and states must bargain to reach an agreement.
Scholars have understood the importance of these decisions for decades, as Zamora wrote in
1980, in an early examination of voting rules schemes in international organizations, “The
importance of decision-making procedures to successful international organization can be seen
by the amount of attention paid by governments to the adoption of appropriate rules of voting
procedure for new organizations.” Yet we still have a lot to learn about these processes.
When designing voting rules, states are faced with the question of decision-making
processes. At its most basic level, this choice can be divided into two general categories:
unanimity rule or majority rule. Unanimity rule carries high costs, as often there is a range of
options for states to choose from and each option has the potential to affect each member
differently, generating a divergent set of preferences among members. And it allows members to
hold out, perhaps for concessions, side-payments, or a straightforward veto (Posner and Sykes,
2014). There is also more potential for institutional ineffectiveness and gridlock with unanimity
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voting (Posner and Sykes, 2014; Blake and Payton, 2014), as most clearly seen at the UNSC
during the Cold War. Majority rule, alternatively, carries lower costs but may give more power
to a minority of members in the organization, resulting in less efficient outcomes or loss of
control over institutional decisions for some (Haftel and Thompson, 2006; Posner and Sykes,
2014; Blake and Payton, 2014). However, this option has the potential to introduce enforcement
problems, as those states not in the majority may prefer to defect from cooperation rather than
complying with an outcome that contradicts their preferences and may be far from their ideal
points (Blake and Payton, 2014).
4. Democratizing States and IGO Voting Rules
Democratizing states face unique challenges and have equally unique motivations for
forming IGOs outside of the general desire for collective efficiency gains, reduced transaction
costs, and benefits to be had through collective action. They must consolidate their new regime
in the wake of potentially difficult transitions and often with little experience or guidance as to
how this can be achieved. Participation in international organizations can assist these states in the
domestic processes of providing public goods and building democratic institutions, and it can
also present an opportunity to address issues of skepticism or uncertainty from the international
community. An examination of the domestic outcomes of IGO participation is outside the scope
of this paper, but a discussion of the international outcomes is warranted here.
With a guaranteed seat at the table comes some degree of control within the institution.
Because interests vary across individual members, and because individual control decreases as
the number of members increases (Koremenos et al. 2001), states are likely to use design
mechanisms like voting rules to maintain control and protect their interests. Voting rules are a
way for states to formalize control of the institution and they “relate to the actor’s importance in
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the institution” (Koremenos, et al. 32). Institutional design data shows us that the amount of
power each member retains within an IGO can vary and is not always equally distributed. The
founders of any new organization must decide how to walk the fine line between encouraging
participation and protecting sovereignty, and this is often done by distributing power through
votes.
Voting rules also help regulate IGO independence, which is “the ability (of the IGO) to
operate in a manner that is insulated from the influence of other political actors - especially
states” (Haftel & Thompson, 256), and concentrates greater control of the IGO into the hands of
its members. Voting rules are of great consequence of the design process. Because they directly
shape the “formal decision-making process, and the distribution of power within that process,
they shape the extent to which states are able to achieve their objectives vis-à-vis their
membership and participation in and IGO” (Blake & Payton, 379).
The interests of democratizing states can vary depending on where they are in the
consolidation process, but often these states share two salient similar characteristics. First, they
tend to be less stable than consolidated democracies or nondemocracies. Second, and they lack
credibility of their commitments due to their status as “new” regimes (Pevehouse, 2006). They
also form new IGOs rather than joining existing ones based on the simple fact that access to
some of the more established and lucrative IGOs is out of reach due to the instability and lack of
credibility of these new regimes (Poast and Urpelainen, 2018).
There is reasonable expectation on the part of the international community that these
former autocracies may not be able to fully implement the democratic reforms necessary to
consolidate their new regime due to a lack of experience with such mechanisms. It is also
reasonable that the international community would view the commitments to participation in
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international cooperation through IGOs with some uncertainty given that the regime is new and
has no reputation for compliance in its early days. For these reasons, states experiencing recent
regime change may prefer to use participation in IGOs as a credible signaling device to
demonstrate their commitment to reform by implementing design constraints that would tie their
hands and show the international community that they are able to operate under such constraints
and still fulfill their commitments (Pevehouse, 2005; Pevehouse and Mansfield, 2006; Nygård,
2017). Because states delegate power to international organizations, these organizations can stay
more committed to policy goals and policy continuity than some domestic governments may be
able to because they are not concerned with reelection. IGOs “are more flexible in policy
formulation and execution; and they can handle controversial issues and enrich public debate”
without deep concerns for the domestic consequences (Zweifel, 17).
States experiencing active or recent regime transitions may also want to eventually join
those IGOs that are initially out of reach, in part for the reasons discussed above. Forming new
IGOs and designing them in such ways as to convey a commitment to cooperation and the ability
to act within formal organizations can signal to existing organizations that these new regimes are
able and willing to uphold their commitments and follow the rules. States wishing to join an
organization like NATO, or the EU, may form a similarly oriented organization that will provide
similar benefits to them and their members, and at the same time demonstrate the capacity to act
within that type of organization. This is particularly evident in the case of the Baltic Battalion,
which served as a precursor to NATO membership for its founding states, Latvia, Lithuania, and
Estonia (Poast and Urpelanien, 2018).
For these reasons I expect these groups of states to prefer to distribute power evenly
throughout the organization and to allow decisions based on a majoritarian system rather than

48

giving veto-power to any member through unanimous voting. This sends credible signals to the
international community that, even when these states are in the minority and when a collective
action runs counter to their own individual interests, they are willing to uphold commitments and
comply with their agreements. These actions generate observable credibility, encouraging the
democratizing states to comply even when compliance may be difficult, and demonstrating that
they are good partners for future cooperation.
5. Distribution of Votes Per Member
One Member, One Vote
As discussed earlier, the type of distribution can have affect international outcomes.
Some organizations allow one vote per member, and other organizations weight the vote based
on criteria such as financial contribution. In cases of one member, one vote designs, each
member has an equal distribution of decision-making power irrespective of the actual level of
real-world power the state may have. This type of voting structure may be attractive to weaker
states who may otherwise be overrun by stronger, more powerful or wealthy states who have the
resources to financially disproportionately to the organization. Powerful states, however, may
prefer a different voting schematic where their power is reflected, and their sovereignty is more
preserved.
Weighted Voting
Weighted voting is an option that will protect the interests of more powerful member
states, where some members retain more control over the IGO through a higher degree of voting
influence than others. This voting structure is typically based on levels of individual member’s
financial contributions to the IGO. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) is one such
organization, where the number of a state’s vote allocation is based on its quota, or financial
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contribution, which “broadly reflect its relative position in the world economy” (IMF). Weighted
voting can protect the interests of powerful states or groups of states that may have similar
interests, as in the case of the IMF. The United States holds the highest vote share within the
organization with 17.44%, and the European Union countries, who tend to vote in a bloc, or
unified group, make up another 26.23%. When you add in the more powerful developed
countries, all of whom are consolidated democracies, there is enough vote share (59.3%) held by
the Western developed democracies to effectively block any measure that requires a simple
majority.
Weaker states are less likely to prefer a weighted-voting system, as they tend to lack the
power and resources to contribute to organizations at levels equitable to those of stronger states.
This puts weaker states in a position of holding less voting power and runs the risk of weaker
states being easily overruled by powerful states. Those states with little voting power may also
be less likely to comply with the decisions of the organization since they have little power to
exert influence over the outcome (McIntyre, 1954; Blake and Payton, 2014).
6. Decision-Making Thresholds
Once votes are distributed, an organization must decide what proportion of the vote is
required for action or decisions. This is another way states can protect their interests within the
IGO and how IGOs can ensure that no member wields too much power within the organization.
Thresholds for decision-making can vary from unanimity to consensus to super or simple
majority, and the outcome of each of these options can have an influence on potential
participation in the organization as well as the organization’s capacity to fulfill its mandate.
Unanimity and Consensus Voting
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Organizations that require unanimity among members to make decisions effectively give
every member veto power, thus protecting the sovereignty of each individual member while
constraining the ability of the organization to act (Blake & Payton, 2014). Unanimous approval,
however, can be desirable when taking action may generate unusually high costs or put states in
a difficult position, as in the case of NATO. When a collective security organization has the
support of each of its members, its actions are seen as highly credible, as there is no active
resistance from any of its members. When NATO invoked Article 5 following the September
11th, 2001 attacks on the United States, the organization and its members sent a credible signal
to the international community that they would not hesitate to act in the face of aggression
against its members. If one state had disagreed about taking action and voted “no,” the U.S. and
other members of the organization would have had to find another venue through which to act,
and the credibility of the organization may have been called into question. However, this
unanimous vote also demonstrated to the world that each member agreed with the action. It also
protected each member from becoming embroiled in an international conflict that it may prefer
to stay out of. The signal being sent by collective unanimity of the members of NATO was
undeniable: the actions of 9/11 would not be tolerated by the members, and that, indeed, an
attack on one was viewed as an attack on all.
However, while unanimity voting protects the sovereignty of each of its individual
members, it can also create a condition of gridlock in situations where one member is the holdout
“no” vote against an otherwise unanimous “yes” from the other members. This veto power
mentioned earlier can stop important tasks delegated to the organization by its member states
from getting completed. Veto power may also be problematic when the real-world distribution of
power is not equitable or close to it. Very powerful states will likely not prefer weaker states to
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have the ability to block their international decisions with a single vote. So, while this voting
design structure may be beneficial to weaker states in an organization, it is unlikely to be seen in
those IGOs with a substantial variation of power among members.
Majority Voting
Majority voting is one utility-maximizing way that states can exert individual control and
protect themselves from uncertainty and unforeseen circumstances (Koremenos et al. 2001). On
the one hand, unanimity and consensus requirements, and particularly the veto power that comes
with them, protect state sovereignty and reign in IGO autonomy, devolving power throughout the
institution equally (Haftel and Thompson, 2006). But on the other hand, more powerful states in
an IGO or perhaps founding members may balk at consensus voting because it also inherently
gives every state equal veto power which may adversely affect state interests. So, states may
implement a majoritarian voting scheme where decisions can be made with a lower threshold of
approval from members.
While majoritarian voting can help address the problem of an effective veto by states who
may or may not be equal in power to the IGO’s most powerful members, it may create another
issue: attracting powerful members in the first place. Those states with the capacity and
resources to support the functioning of an IGO may prefer not to contribute asymmetrically if
their contributions are not reflected in the distribution of power within the organization.
Majoritarian voting can sideline powerful members if the distribution of voting power is
equitable across members, and this is related to the implementation of weighted voting in some
IGOs.
Another potential problem with a majoritarian voting design is compliance. Those states
who do not support a decision or action by the majority of members of an IGO may prefer to
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defect from cooperation rather than comply with a decision they formally objected to with a vote
that ends up in the minority. This is especially true if the “losing” state’s (or states’) preferences
diverge considerably from the outcome (Blake and Payton, 2014). Koremenos et al. (2001)
argue, however, that this will likely not be an issue for those states who are committed to future
iterations of cooperation, as they will, at some point, be in the winning coalition and will expect
those in the losing coalition to comply with the decision as well.
7.1 Hypothesis A: Democratizing states are likely to prefer one member, one vote vote
distribution to weighted voting in IGOs they are founding members of and for which they have
input into the design process.
Because membership access to some of the organizations that democratizing states form
could be open to states that may not be going through a regime transition or may be more
powerful or have more resources than the democratizing states, I expect these states to bargain
for an equal distribution of votes. This design element of vote distribution will ensure that
weaker states will not get run over in the voting process by stronger states who, by virtue of their
economic or political power in the international community and their capacity to potentially
contribute more to the organization financially, would have such an asymmetrical distribution of
power that they would have unofficial carte blanche control over the actions of the organization.
This could also give these powerful states the opportunity to thwart action by the IGO should a
particular action conflict with their interests. As discussed earlier, a situation akin to this scenario
exists in the IMF, as the combination of weighted votes held between the great Western powers
of the United States and the members of the European Union, who typically vote as a bloc, is
essentially enough to approve or block some loans or projects if they all vote together. A one
member, one vote voting distribution design would distribute power equally amongst weaker and
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stronger states and give weaker states more power in the organization than they would have
should the distribution of votes be weighted.
An equal distribution of votes is also a more democratic method of distributing power
among the members and puts each member on a level playing field regardless of power,
resources, or other factors that may otherwise advantage some while disadvantaging others. An
equal distribution of votes means that states will have to work harder to form coalitions with
other members if they strongly feel one way or the other about an initiative or action being
considered by the organization. States who are trying to convey a credible signal to the
international community that they are willing and able to participate in formal cooperation
through an organization will have better outcomes if votes are equally distributed.
7.2 Hypothesis B: Democratizing states are likely to prefer majority voting to consensus or
unanimity on decisions of action in IGOs they are founding members of and for which they have
input into the design process.
Because democratizing states have formed IGOs in effort to generate benefits that are
likely hard to come by otherwise, and because unanimous and consensus voting present
opportunities for one member to block action by the IGO, I expect that majority voting to be the
most preferred voting scheme. While all IGOs are formed to generate benefits, there are reasons
states may restrict the power of members by incorporating unanimous voting mechanisms into
their procedures. This protects the interests of individual members more so than majoritarian
voting rules, but it can generate gridlock and block important actions by the group.
Democratizing states are in the process of consolidating democratic reforms and should value the
generation of collective benefits over self-interest. Conducting business in a democratic fashion,
as with majoritarian voting, conveys to the international community that the democratizing or
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newly democratic members of the IGO are willing to uphold their commitments even if they are
in the minority.
7.3 Research Design
I have assembled a new dataset compiled of measurements of certain design elements of
interest so that I may test my hypothesis. The unit of analysis for the tests run in this
investigation is the year of IGO formation (IGO-year) of three different categories of IGOs. This
investigation limits the sample to IGO-year of IGO formation to parse out the effect of
democratization on the likelihood that certain membership choices are made by groups of these
states at the time of IGO formation. The main dependent variable is Regional Constraints, the
key independent variable is the regime type of the founding membership of the IGO, and each
model includes several controls. More on the construction and operationalization of these
variables is discussed in sections 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6 of this paper.
My goal with this research is to compare the design choices within IGOs formed by
different sets of states. Specifically, I look at how groups of democratizing states make those
design choices as compared to the choices made by groups of states with a majority of founding
members having either democratic or nondemocratic regime types when they form new IGOs.
To do this systematically, I begin with the list of IGOs identified by Poast and Urpelainen (2018)
as being founded by democratizing states. There are twenty-seven IGOs included in this data7. I
then draw from the latest version (v3) of Intergovernmental Organizations data (Pevehouse et al.
2019) housed within the Correlates of War (COW) database and identify organizations founded
by democratic states and by autocratic states. The IGOs in this dataset are coded according to

7

One of the IGOs identified by Poast and Urpelainen as being founded by democratizing states, the Baltic

Environmental Forum, is not included in the COW IGO data, so I dropped it from this new dataset. A complete
list of the IGOs included in the data can be found in the Appendix to this paper in Table 5.
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mandate: social, political, and economic. I use the COW IGO data to first identify the mandate of
each IGO from Poast and Urpelainen to ensure that I am comparing these organizations with
similar ones. I was able to find the original founding charter for twenty-one of these IGOs, and
these are the IGOs I analyze and include in this dataset and analysis; the makeup of this group by
mandate is such: twelve economic organizations, seven political organizations, and two social
organizations.
Next, using the data in IGO-country-year format that included only founding member
states, I identified a comparable distribution across IGO mandates founded by a majority of
democratic states and IGOs founded by a majority nondemocratic group of states. To do this, I
use the founding member states’ Polity scores at the time of IGO creation, considering states
with a Polity score greater than or equal to seven to be consolidated democracies, those with
Polity scores less than or equal to negative seven to be consolidated autocracies, and those with a
score of less than seven but greater than negative seven to be anocracies. I then calculate the
democratic, anocratic, or autocratic density of each organization in the COW IGO dataset so that
I may identify those IGOs that are majority democratic or majority nondemocratic; meaning that
at least 51% of founding members met the democratic or nondemocratic threshold discussed
above. My goal was to build a dataset that would represent the greatest likelihood of specific
design elements being preferred by collective groups of states made up of a particular regime
type. To do this, I identified those organizations whose founding members were 51+%
democracies and then whose founders included 51+% nondemocracies. I then randomly chose
organizations that had five or more founding members from each mandate category to
correspond with the number of IGOs from each mandate category identified by Poast and
Urpelainen.
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The criteria for choosing a particular IGO: being founded by at least five states, a
majority of whom shared a similar regime type, is more stringent that the criteria used by Poast
and Urpelainen to identify IGOs founded by democratizing states. The IGOs they include in their
analysis upon which I am building this research are IGOs whose founding membership was
made up of at least twenty-five percent new democracies. I set the bar high for a couple of
important reasons. First, bargaining over the terms of agreements becomes more difficult as the
number of actors at the bargaining table increases. Five or more sovereign states coming together
to form a formal international governmental organization requires more actors to bargain over
allowances and constraints, ensuring that the design decisions likely did not come too easily. The
types of constraints on behavior that are built into an agreement may incrementally increase
participation costs by way of decreasing sovereignty.
I also required 51+% of the founding members to be of similar regime type so I may
make a reasonable assumption that these actors have generally similar interests, and that the
design choices made by these actors will reflect these interests. Although Poast and Urpelainen
use a much lower threshold in their consideration of IGOs founded by democratizing states, I
chose to use a higher threshold to increase the confidence of my comparisons.
To generate the IGO-year format of the final dataset used in this analysis, I collapsed the
data to reflect the design choices made by the collective group of founding member states in the
year the IGO was created. Each observation is an IGO in its founding year.
7.4 Dependent Variables: Voting Rules
7.4a: Distribution of Votes: Because voting often reflects the distribution of power, I
include it in my analysis, and code each organization based on whether votes are distributed
equally, as in a one-member, one-vote situation, if voting is weighted, or if votes are distributed
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in some other fashion. The classifications used in this analysis are dichotomous for each of the
two categories of interest, one member, one vote or weighted voting, with 1 indicating that an
IGOs falls into a category and 0 if not. In the cases where votes are distributed via a combination
of equitable distribution and weighted voting, the IGO is classified as a 2, having weighted
voting. Summary statistics of distribution of votes by regime type can be found in table 3.1.
One example of this type of voting distribution can be seen in the 1976 Arab Monetary
Fund founding charter. This is one of the autocratic organizations included in my dataset and
uses a combination of equal distribution and weighted distribution of votes. Each member is
automatically granted seventy-five votes and then receives one vote per share of authorized
capital contribution, which is weighted according to economic capacity. Subscription to the
capital shares is made according to a schedule attached to the charter with the subscription for
newly admitted members being determined by the organization’s Board of Governors. This
results in subscriptions in capital per member ranging from 38,000 (Algeria and Saudi Arabia) to
1,700 (Palestine). Other notable shareholders are Iraq, Kuwait, and Eqypt, each with 25,000
shares, the United Arab Emirates with 15,000 shares at the high end of the range, and states like
Syria, Somolia, and Mauritania among those at the lower end of the range with 4,000 shares.
This share distribution and its translation into votes illustrates the preservation of power within
the organization of some of the states who are more wealthy and powerful outside of the
organization, reflecting the real state of the world.

58

Regime Type

One Member,

Weighted

Other Type of

Voting Not

One Vote

Voting

Voting

Designated

Democratizing

11

1

1

8

Democratic

17

4

0

5

Non-Democratic

13

6

1

7

Total

41

11

1

20

Table 3.1: Voting Distribution by Regime Type Summary Statistics

7.4b: Decision-making threshold: Unanimity is a somewhat uncommon threshold in
IGO charter design, however. While some IGOs require a consensus among members, we are
much more likely to find that decisions are made based on some type of majority vote. A simple
majority of fifty percent plus one is a low threshold that allows for more decisive action by the
organization, but at a sovereignty cost to member states. I find that a majority of the IGOs in this
dataset employ a majority vote threshold, though many set the bar for decisions at two-thirds. I
do not differentiate between simple majority and supermajority in this data, as this is a first cut at
design preferences. To create this variable, I first identified if an organization’s charter
implemented voting rules according to one of six categories: unanimous; consensus; majority;
delegated to committee; other; and not specified. I then created a dichotomous variable to
indicate whether an organization employed a unanimous/consensus voting scheme, 1 if yes, 0 if
no, and another to indicate a majority vote scheme, again, 1 if yes and 0 if no. Summary statistics
of decision-making threshold by regime type can be found in table 3.2.
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Regime Type

Unanimous/Consensus Majority

Not Designated

Democratizing*

7

11

3

Democratic

9

15

2

Non-Democratic

6

16

4

Total

22

42

9

Table 3.2: Decision-Making Threshold by Regime Type Summary Statistics
*Based on Poast & Urpelainen 2018

7.5 Key Independent Variable: Regime Type of IGO Founding Membership
The primary independent variable in this analysis represents a measure of the regime type
of the IGO by identifying the IGOs in the dataset as being founded by a majority of democratic
actors or a majority of non-democratic actors. This was done by calculating the democratic
density (Pevehouse, 2002) of each organization based on the regime type of its founding
members in the first year of the organization according to Polity2 scores, and then coding the
organizations as democratic (1), anocratic (2), or autocratic (3). This process was described in
more depth earlier in section 4.2 of this paper. I then assigned a dichotomous designation of
democratic (1 if more than half of the founding members were democracies, 0 otherwise) or
nondemocratic (1 if more than half of the founding members were nondemocracies, including
both anocracies and autocracies, 0 if otherwise) to each IGO.
The distribution of this variable is wide, ranging from 0% to 100%. Of all 73 IGOs in the
dataset, 15 are made up of zero democracies. Thirty of them are made up of 25% or less
democratic members and 38 have less than 50% democratic members. Thirty-five IGOs are
made up of 50% or more democratic members, 24 have more than 75% democratic members,
and seven are made up of 100% democracies. The full distribution can be found in figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of IGOs by Democratic Density
7.6 Control Variables
Because powerful states are less likely to prefer to cede influence and sovereignty in the
collective decision-making process of IGO participation, I control for whether a major power
was a founding member of the IGO or not, thereby having influence over the design process. I
consider the Permanent Five of the United Nations Security Council (United Kingdom, the
United States, France, China, and Russia) to be major powers. This variable is a dichotomous
measure, a 1 indicating that there was at least one major power founding member, and 0 if not. I
also include a control for number of founding members. As the number of members increases,
the bargaining process becomes more difficult since there are more interests and preferences to
contend with.
8. Results
The results of this analysis are insignificant across the board, and this very well could be
a result of a small sample. However, I will discuss the general takeaways from this analysis as
well as potential opportunities for a deeper understanding through future research.
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8.1 Testing Hypothesis A
The first analyses I ran sought to deeper understand the relationship between regime type
and how voting power is distributed within an organization at the time of design. While none of
my tests yielded statistically significant results, we can consider the general patterns of the
outcomes as a starting point for deeper and perhaps more extensive analysis of international
organization design.
Hypothesis A, democratizing states are likely to prefer one member, one vote vote
distribution to weighted voting in IGOs they are founding members of and have input into the
design process, focuses on how states with different regime types may prefer to distribute power
within a new international organization through the mechanism of voting. Most IGOs have a
decision-making body composed of members who will vote on certain items of business, and
that voting process can determine whether or not action is taken by the IGO. The results shown
in table 3.3 indicate that there is a negative relationship between the one member, one vote
voting design and IGOs designed by democratizing states. However, the relationship is positive,
yet almost indistinguishable given the nearly flat line, when controlling for the presence of a
major power member and number of founding members. The predicted probabilities of each
model are found in figures 3.2 and 3.3, respectively, and indicate that, while the relationship is
negative for model 1 and positive for model 1.1, the relationship is insignificant as the wide
confidence bands overlap the intercept.
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Table 3.3
Variables
Democratizing IGO

Model 1
One Member One Vote

Model 1.1
One Member One Vote

-0.215
(0.519)

-0.241
(0.600)
0.824
(0.549)
-0.0395
(0.0304)
0.422
(0.568)

Major Power Member
Number of Members
Constant

0.310
(0.281)

Observations
73
73
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 3.2

Figure 3.3

Models 2, 2.1, 3, and 3.1 are similar to models 1 and 1.1 in that they illustrate the
relationship between a group of IGOs founded by a particular set of states and the likelihood that
a one member, one vote vote distribution will be chosen by those states. Models 2 and 2.1
investigate that relationship focusing on IGOs designed by a majority democratic states. As seen
in the coefficient table, the relationship is positive, though insignificant, in both models. The
predicted probabilities for each are shown in figures 3.4 and 3.5 below, each indicating similar
results as models 1 and 1.1; the relationship is insignificant as illustrated by the wide overlapping
confidence bands.
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Table 3.4
Variables
Democratic IGO

Model 2
One Member One Vote

Model 2.2
One Member One Vote

0.593
(0.505)

0.674
(0.773)
0.488
(0.685)
-0.0445
(0.0311)
0.355
(0.442)

Major Power Member
Number of Members
Constant

0.0426
(0.292)

Observations
73
73
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 3.4

Figure 3.5

Continuing the investigation into the relationship between regime type and voting
preferences in IGOs, models 3 and 3.1 conduct the same test, but limit the explanatory variable
to IGOs founded by nondemocracies. This test yields interesting, though insignificant results in
that the relationship in both cases is negative. This outcome indicates that, regardless of if a
founding member is a major power, those IGOs founded by majority nondemocratic states are
less likely to prefer a one member, one vote power distribution within the organization. The
results of this test are found in table 3.5, and the predicted probabilities are shown in figures 3.6
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and 3.7. Again, the wide, overlapping confidence bands indicate that, though the relationship is
negative, that it is statistically insignificant.
Table 3.5
VARIABLES
Nondemocratic IGO

Model 3
One Member One Vote

Model 3
One Member One Vote

-0.388
(0.492)

-0.134
(0.542)
0.819
(0.575)
-0.0350
(0.0288)
0.341
(0.510)

Major Power Member
Number of Members
Constant

Observations

0.388
(0.297)

73
73
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 3.6

Figure 3.7

8.2 Testing Hypothesis B
The second set of analyses I conduct test the relationship between regime type of the
founding membership of IGOs and the decision-making threshold within the organization. These
tests address hypothesis B, democratizing states are likely to prefer majority voting to consensus
or unanimity on decisions of action in IGOs they are founding members of and have input into
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the design process. The reason for this is that consensus and unanimity voting threatens state
autonomy and sovereignty by effectively issuing every member veto power. Majority voting
gives states a more equitable role in decision-making processes. It is also more likely that states
comply with decisions even if they are in the losing coalition since they are aware that they will
be in the winning coalition at other times. Unanimous and consensus voting has the potential to
cause institutional gridlock as was seen at the UNSC during the Cold War, discussed earlier in
this paper. By implementing a majority voting scheme, states are more likely to avoid this
undesirable outcome, limit each members’ autonomy and power within the organization, and
yield more democratic outcomes which are more likely to generate compliance.
As with the tests conducted for hypothesis A, I test hypothesis B on each of the three IGO
subsets categorized by founding regime type. Model 4 focuses on the subset of states of central
interest to this analysis, democratizing states. Interestingly, there is a negative, albeit statistically
insignificant result. The coefficient results in table 3.6 indicate that IGOs founded by
democratizing states are less likely to include decision-making threshold schemes that are
decided by majority voting. The presence of a major power does not affect the outcome.
However, as with each of the previous, and following, models, the predicted probabilities
illustrate that these results are insignificant due to the wide and overlapping confidence bands.
The predicted probabilities for models 4 and 4.1 can be found below in figures 3.8 and 3.9,
respectively.
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Table 3.6
VARIABLES
Democratizing IGO

Model 4
Majority Voting

Model 4.1
Majority Voting

-0.294
(0.520)

0.143
(0.594)
-0.121
(0.549)
0.0602*
(0.0338)
-0.441
(0.579)

Major Power Member
Number of Members
Constant

Observations

Figure 3.8

0.389
(0.283)
73
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

73

Figure 3.9

Following my approach to the earlier analysis of vote distribution, I run the same tests for
IGOs founded by democracies and by nondemocracies, each time controlling for the presence of
a major power in the design process. Similarly, the results for each are statistically insignificant,
however, the signs of the coefficients testing the preferences of democracies change when a
major power is present. Table 3.7 contains the coefficient results of the test run on democratic
IGOs, and the relationship between regime type and a preference for majority voting is positive
until controlled for the presence of a major power, in which case the relationship is negative.
This indicates that major powers are less likely to prefer majority voting and seem to be willing
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to bargain against including that particular decision-making process in the design of the
organizations they create. However, this relationship is statistically insignificant in both cases, as
illustrated in the predicted probability graphs shown in figures 3.10 and 3.11, which contain wide
and overlapping confidence bands.
Table 3.7
Variables
Democratic IGO

Model 5
Majority Voting

Model 5.1
Majority Voting

0.0101
(0.495)

-0.904
(0.782)
0.369
(0.715)
0.0697**
(0.0344)
-0.453
(0.453)

Major Power Member
Number of Members
Constant

Observations

0.300
(0.295)

73
73
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 3.10

Figure 3.11

Table 3.8 presents the coefficient results for the test run on nondemocratic IGOs, who, in
each case seem to prefer majority voting, though the results continue to be statistically
insignificant. These positive relationships are illustrated in the predicted probabilities displayed
in figures 3.12 and 3.13.
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Table 3.8
VARIABLES
Nondemocratic IGO

Model 6
Majority Voting

Model 6.1
Majority Voting

0.256
(0.499)

0.339
(0.545)
-0.0320
(0.572)
0.0564*
(0.0323)
-0.518
(0.518)

Major Power Member
Number of Members
Constant

Observations

Figure 3.12

0.214
(0.293)
73
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

73

Figure 3.13

9. Conclusion
How and why states make the design choices they make when forming international
organizations is an area ripe for further research in the field of international relations. These
choices influence the functionality of organizations and the outcomes of cooperation. They may
also play a role in the regime transition of states and in the consolidation of democracy in those
states undergoing the transition process (Pevehouse, 2006; Pevehouse and Mansfield, 2006,
2008; Poast and Urpelainen, 2018). Scholars are still investigating the process of these choices
and what factors influence the outcomes we observe. This analysis is a first cut at understanding
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the relationship between regime type and voting design choices in international organization
design. While the results may, on their face, seem somewhat disappointing given that there is no
statistical significance in the six tests I conducted, there is some valuable insight to be had.
First, it appears that, in most (but not all) instances, there is a preference for an equal
distribution of power via vote distribution. This is not the case in IGOs founded by
democratizing states until controlling for the presence of a major power. It is also not the case in
IGOs founded by nondemocracies when controlling for the presence of a major power. This
presents a few opportunities for further investigation, particularly whether the regime type of the
major power is a factor. While this question is outside the scope of this paper, and the dataset
herein is likely too small to yield any meaningful results, future researchers may expand on this
data by including more IGO charters and pivoting to the question of the role of major powers in
IGO design and how the regime type of those actors may influence outcomes.
Secondly, it seems as though there is a negative relationship between democracies and a
preference for majority voting schemes in international organization design. This was an
unexpected result, as most democracies operate domestically on a majority-rule system of voting
when electing representatives and conducting legislative business. Curiously, only
nondemocracies seem more likely to prefer majority voting for decision-making processes, and
this is true with and without controlling for the presence of a major power in the design process.
This also presents opportunity for future investigation by expanding the dataset.
The design process of states forming new international organizations is consequential for
the efficacy of international cooperation, and much is still unknown. It is my hope that, despite
the lack of statistically significant results in this analysis, this research and this new dataset may
be used to generate interesting questions and meaningful understanding of how and why IGOs
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appear in the forms they take on, and what consequences these design decisions have on
international cooperation.
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CHAPTER 4: EXPLAINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MECHANISMS AND REGIME TYPE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION DESIGN

1. Introduction
Do democratizing states prefer to design their international agreements differently than
democracies and autocracies? Specifically, how does each group view the inclusion of
formalized dispute resolution mechanisms into the charters of international organizations of
which they are founding members and have input into the design process? Democratizing, and
newly democratized, states are more likely to form new international organizations rather than
join existing ones, in part because they face unique challenges presented by the consolidation
process, and participation in international organizations may provide valuable assistance in that
process (Poast and Urpelainen, 2018; Pevehouse, 2005). International agreements can tie hands,
compelling leaders of transition regimes to act in ways that may otherwise be difficult to
rationalize. They can help transition regimes send credible signals to the international
community that they are serious about regime change and also about being viewed as a viable
partner in cooperation (Pevehouse, 2005; Pevehouse and Mansfield, 2006; Nygård 2017).
When two parties have a dispute in a domestic context, they may seek some form of
mediation or arbitration from a disinterested third party whose decision will be binding. This
may be done through private consultations or through a public courts system (Mattli in
Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001). This is not immediately possible due to the lack of one
overarching international court where disputes may be settled. The condition of anarchy in the
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international community creates a cooperative environment wrought with potential problems.
Because there is no overarching authority whose purpose is to enforce commitments or to
compel states to act in accordance with their international agreements, the possibility of
defection from commitments is high. Yet we tend to see high rates of compliance with
international agreements, indicating that international law can affect state behavior. This could
be because international cooperation is an opt-in system, and states choose to enter into
agreements that are designed to serve their interests (Downs et al. 1996). It could be because
noncompliance has reputational costs that may affect cooperation opportunities down the road.
Cooperation encourages reciprocity (Axelrod ,1984; Keohane, 1986), which can help perpetuate
cooperation if everyone is complying. The long-term benefits of cooperation tend to outweigh
the short-term gains from defecting. One option states have to deal with the uncertainty of future
compliance or defection from international agreements is to incorporate dispute resolution
mechanisms into these agreements so that there is a clearer path to resolving issues that are most
likely to lead to defection. Formal dispute resolution mechanisms may make cooperation harder
and agreements more costly. But they also increase the costs of violation by providing for some
penalty or sanction to be applied to the violator, making this an attractive option in cases of
uncertainty (Guzman, 2002).
This paper contributes to the cooperation and design literatures by expanding on work by
Paul Poast and Johannes Urpelainen (2018) indicating that democratizing states are more likely
to form new IGOs than they are to join existing ones. The reason for this, they argue, is that the
accession criteria to join many of the most established IGOs is out of reach for this unique subset
of states. Poast and Urpelainen’s work provides a jumping off point to inquire about the design
choices of states of different regime types. Here, I focus on choices in dispute resolution options
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broadly by analyzing whether a dispute resolution mechanism is included in the formal rules of
the organization or not, and if so, does regime type matter in explaining their choices.
I argue that those democratizing states that are founding members of new IGOs and are
involved in the design process are more likely to include a formalized dispute resolution
mechanism in the rules of the organization. The reason for this expectation is that democratizing
states are faced with a couple of unique challenges: they need to tie their hands so that they may
implement tough domestic reforms aimed at consolidation, and they need to convey credibility of
their commitment to regime change to the international community. Implementing dispute
resolution mechanisms will contribute to the achievement of both of those goals.
2. What Do We Know About Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in IGO Design?
Prior to the establishment of the WTO and its adjudication mechanism for solving
disputes, the international community saw the establishment of several international courts
designed to resolve disputes. The International Court of Justice (1945), the European Court of
Justice (1952), the European Court of Human Rights (1959, made permanent in 1998), and the
International Criminal Court (2002) are all venues for adjudication between international actors
and serve as an option when domestic courts are unable to solve disputes due to jurisdictional
constraints. In addition to these standing courts, temporary courts have been convened as well,
with extensive variation across issue area, region, and regime type, indicating that states see a
value in independent third-party evaluation of disputes and that they respect the validity of the
decisions made by these venues (Schneider, 2006). It is reasonable, then, to assume that states
incorporate dispute resolution mechanisms into the rules of the IGOs they create and design for
the same reasons. They are valuable and help protect the interests of member states.
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However, one may wonder, why continue to create new dispute resolution procedures to
include in individual organizations when international courts already exist? The costs of creation
have already been sunk into the formation, design, and establishment of these courts, like the
ones discussed earlier, so why not just adjudicate disputes through them rather than reinventing
the wheel for a specific organization? The answer is that design varies, including within these
courts which exist to help states resolve disputes. Scholars studying international dispute
settlement have identified some dimensions across which dispute settlement design varies, and
that can affect how and when states choose to use existing courts or to create an organizationspecific option (Alter, 2011; Keohane et al, 2000; Smith, 2000). Who enjoys standing in a
particular court will determine if disputing parties even have access to the services of a court.
States may take issue with how independent the court is based on how judges are appointed.
Whether a court has jurisdiction over the dispute may render it unable to take the case. States
typically must have ratified membership to the court in order for the court to intervene. And how
binding a court’s decision is may affect a state’s propensity to prefer another means of dispute
settlement out of uncertainty that it will be bound to a decision that conflicts with its interests
(Tallberg and Smith, 2014).
Much of the literature on international organization design acknowledges dispute
resolution mechanisms (DRMs) as an important consideration made by states. Being identified
as a violator by having a formal dispute claim filed against a state can have reputational costs
and presents an opportunity by aggrieved parties to punish the violation. It also provides
information to the other members, as well as the international community regarding a state’s
behavior (Guzman, 2002). However, in addition to the considerations discussed above, there is a
sovereignty cost to ceding control of dispute settlement to a third party whose decision may
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conflict with the interests of the individual states involved in the disputes. This level of
delegation is sometimes difficult for states to accept and helps explain some of the variation we
see across the range of choices available to states. While formal delegation to a third party is at
one extreme of the range, at the other is the encouragement of states to negotiate between or
among themselves to reach an amicable resolution (Davis, 2015). In between these two extremes
is the option to formalize dispute resolution within an organization itself, drawing from parties
within, and occasionally outside of, the organization to serve as mediators, arbitrators, or even
adjudicators. States may prefer an option falling within these options because they are able to
dictate the process and protect the interests of the organization and its member states via design.
3. The Critical Shift in International Dispute Resolution: From the GATT to the WTO
Much of the early literature focuses specifically on an innovation coming out of the
transition of the GATT into the WTO. This can be partially attributed to the fact that the WTO is
a vast organization, open to any sovereign state or customs territory retaining full autonomy over
its trade policies; only fourteen states have declined to join.8 The strength of the dispute
resolution process within the WTO has led to it becoming a main venue for the settlement and
adjudication of trade disputes. And because the dispute specifics and outcomes are public and
published by the organization, the WTO is a ripe source for data accessible to scholars.
The move from the GATT to the WTO was a monumental shift in international dispute
resolution processes. The dispute resolution rules of the GATT were often criticized as being
vague and lacking details, containing “only two provisions on dispute settlement, Articles XXII
and XXIII, and neither contained any specific procedure” (Kantchevski, 2007). Under the terms

8

According to wto.org
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of the GATT, dispute resolution was almost exclusively conducted through diplomatic
negotiations and powerful states were often at an advantage. If diplomatic negotiations States
accused of violation had veto power over the authorization of sanctions, making the application
of them difficult (Tallberg and Smith 2014). However, this weak system of resolution and
enforcement at the time of the GATT’s inception was one that the creators of the organization
expected to evolve over time and to become more legalized and enforceable. In fact, the United
States, one of the major players in the creation of the GATT, attempted to implement
improvements to the functionality of the dispute settlement system during the Uruguay Round of
international trade negotiations in 1986 (Davey, 1987).
When the WTO was established in 1995 by the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, in included the explicit creation of a dispute resolution process
known as the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), which was binding on all WTO
members. It also set up the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) as a permanent compulsory
adjudication body as well as an Appellate Body. This entire system takes “legal primacy over all
other means of dispute settlement” and “also precludes the use of other unilateral action for the
resolution of WTO-related disputes,” (Kantchevski, 86-87). However, the WTO system still
encourages disputing parties to continue to attempt to reach a mutually agreeable resolution at
each stage of the formal dispute resolution process, allowing for a complainant to end the formal
process should a resolution be mutually reached.
The innovation of this legalized dispute resolution mechanism in the WTO signaled a
move by the greater international community to value an independent evaluation and
interpretation of possible violations and to respect the outcome and either accept the binding
ruling or take advantage of the opportunity for appeal. It also generated extensive scholarship on
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the functionality and efficacy of formalized dispute resolution. While we see an expansion of
focus past the GATT/WTO in more recent literature, often the IGOs considered continue to be
the large, established ones like the EU, NAFTA, and, yes, more WTO. Ásgeirsdóttir and
Steinwand (2015) shift concentration on specific IGOs to investigate the Law of the Sea regime
of maritime law contracts, finding that state wealth may drive variation of preferences for
bilateral negotiations versus formal settlement mechanisms. Poorer states prefer bilateral
negotiations of disputes, as they are more concerned with the higher costs and lack of flexibility
in agreements that refer disputes to an institutionalized body. There has also been work
examining the role of the WTO as an adjudication forum when trade and environmental policies
conflict (Johnson and Urpelainen, 2020). This is an interesting question that has not been
addressed in the earlier literature considering variation in dispute resolution procedures across
issue area.
There is also scholarship considering the role of regime type in international disputes.
Constructivists (Mitchell, 2002; Finnemore, 1996; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998; Barnett and
Finnemore, 2004) argue that states tend to “externalize the norms that characterize their domestic
political processes,” (Mitchell, 749). If this is the case, we should expect to see more provisions
for a peaceful resolution to disputes in those organizations founded by democracies. And we do.
Democracies are more likely to settle disputes peacefully, and when a resolution is not possible,
they are more likely to bring international disputes into a formal adjudication process, both in
trade disputes and territorial disputes (Allee and Huth, 2006; Davis, 2012 & 2015; Mitchell,
2002). This may indicate that democracies are more likely than other regime types to incorporate
dispute resolution mechanisms into the design of the international organizations that they form,
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or it could simply be evidence that they are willing to use them should they be available. I
attempt to shed some light on this question in this paper.
In this same vein, there is reason to expect that democracies benefit from these options
because dispute resolution systems are costly; designed to favor powerful states and exploit
power differentials, which may explain why they are less likely to be used by developing states.
For example, filing claims at the WTO incurs fees, the possibility of costly economic sanctions,
diplomatic retaliation, and a loss of access to trade opportunities while the legal dispute
settlement process takes place (Busch and Reinhardt, 2003; Brown, 2004 & 2009; Davis and
Shirato, 2007; Davis and Bermeo, 2009; Allee and Peinhardt, 2014, Davis, 2012 & 2015). Or it
could be because democratic norms dictate that, when negotiation fails, it is reasonable to
delegate to a court and to accept the decision of that court, and so they are more likely to trust the
DRM and to bring cases before the decision-making body.
It is also of note that states often forum-shop, and the inclusion of DRMs in newly
formed international organizations could be the product of several dynamics at play. States may
choose to design and include DRMs because they expect the organization, its members, and its
decision-making agents will likely come to more appropriate and palatable decisions regarding
disputes between members because they all have an interest in seeing the organization
functioning properly and compliance maintained. States may expect that an existing court, like
the ICJ or the ECJ, may be too removed from the best interests of the organization and its
members. Similarly, they may expect the outcomes to be more appropriate coming from a panel
within the organization than one from an independent court (Lefler, 2014). And, as mentioned
previously, Koremenos and Betz (2013) point out that including a DRM can help screen out
likely violators prior to them even joining an organization in the first place, saving a lot of time,
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cost, and effort. This can also help in increasing the perception of a member’s credibility to the
commitment, again, a challenge that democratizing states must overcome.
4. Choosing Among Dispute Resolution Mechanism Options
Bargaining is a constant condition of cooperation. Fearon argues that bargaining not only
happens at the beginning of cooperation when states are deciding whether they want to cooperate
at all, and if so, how to cooperate prior to implementing an agreement, but it continues through
cooperation up to and including enforcement of the agreement (1998). When states disagree on
matters of international politics, they have several options as to how to handle these disputes.
Because the international system operates under a condition of anarchy, states are often left to
their own devices when faced with challenges by other actors. Most of the time disputes are
handled through diplomatic negotiations or retaliatory actions like sanctions. Occasionally,
disputes rise to the level of conflict. International organizations can help states avoid getting to
the point where sanctions or conflict may occur. Cooperation through an international
organization can set expectations because the rules are codified into formal charters. Even when
an organization includes a formal dispute resolution procedure, the bargaining process for a
settlement has already begun, and has often been going on for some time. “States bargain for
settlement at multiple stages of international dispute resolution: before recourse to formal noncompliance procedures; once proceedings have been initiated in an attempt to preclude
adjudication; and in the aftermath of legal rulings” (Tallberg and Smith, 119).
As discussed earlier, there are a lot of unknowns for actors entering into international
agreements, and these unknowns often include issues of uncertainty; not the least of which is will
partners in cooperation uphold their commitments? If member states’ interests should change in
the future, even in the short term, states may be discouraged from cooperation. One way to
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address these concerns is to design effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms into
agreements, including some formalized dispute resolution process. This presents the opportunity
for states to choose among several options. I borrow from Koremenos (2007) to present some of
the most prominent options of dispute resolution considered and implemented by states when
they are designing international agreements.
Informal Negotiations and Diplomacy
At the most basic and most informal level, states can negotiate between or among
themselves to resolve a dispute. This includes diplomatic meetings that are between the parties
involved but are not brought in front of the organization and are not formally presented to a
tribunal or arbitration committee, or even side payments (Koremenos and Betz, 2013). Informal
settlement of disputes is quite common, and sometimes this is the only option expressly built into
an organization’s charter or rules of procedure. Even when agreements are designed with a
formal dispute resolution procedure, “informal settlements are explicitly encouraged in the vast
majority of agreements… (and they) also take place in the shadow of these more legalized
mechanisms” (Koremenos and Betz, 2013). Most importantly, these informal negotiations are
nonbinding, often done in private, and attempted before more formal avenues are visited.
Mediation
Mediation is slightly more formal but, like diplomatic negotiations, is nonbinding on the
parties involved. During mediation, a neutral third party, often from within the organization, is
chosen to “assist disputing parties to in reaching a mutually agreeable solution” but a formal,
binding decision is not rendered (Koremenos, 198). In cases of mediation, the third party simply
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serves to help reconcile the positions between the parties in an attempt to resolve the dispute
without having to escalate to arbitration or adjudication.
Arbitration
Arbitration also involves a third-party actor whose responsibility is to actively work with
the disputants towards reconciliation. The third party may be an individual from within the
organization or may be a panel assembled by members chosen by the disputants from inside or
outside the organization; often the panel is a combination of both. In arbitration, the third party
normally resolves the dispute via a decision or a recommendation, and whether these decisions
are binding on the states is determined by the rules of the organization. This differs from
mediation in that mediators are there to facilitate negotiations to the point of resolution while
arbitrators serve to resolve the dispute. Arbitration outcomes are generally likely to be binding,
especially in the cases of decisions versus recommendations.
Adjudication
Adjudication is at the highest end of the formality scale, as one might gather from the
term adjudicate, which happens when a dispute is presented to a court. The court can either be
established by the organization or the dispute may be referred to an existing court. For example,
some IGOs choose to utilize the European Court of Justice, while others prefer the International
Court of Justice. In these cases, the dispute is heard by the court and a decision is handed down
by the court, without involvement of the organization, and the decision is likely to be binding on
all parties, but it is up to the member states to decide if it is required to be. Whether the decision
is binding will be determined in the charter or rules of procedure. Adjudication is typically
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regarded as the most unbiased form of dispute resolution, but also comes with the highest
sovereignty costs.
5. Democratizing States and Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in IGO Design
Membership in IGOs can have a positive effect on democratizing states’ credibility by
demonstrating to the international community that they are able to cooperate with multiple actors
who may have divergent interests and that they are willing and able to uphold commitments
(Pevehouse, 2003 & 2005, Pevehouse and Mansfield, 2006). Membership in IGOs gives states
who have not had a chance to establish a reputation for sticking to their commitments the
opportunity to develop international trust and political capital, and the act of delegating power to
an IGO can have a positive effect on reputation. In fact, “membership in the GATT/WTO,
membership in the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, and
ratification of the Optional Protocol on the abolishment of the death penalty are particularly
conducive to boost credibility,” (Dreher and Voight, 2011).
Developing a positive reputation as a credible partner in international cooperation can
have important benefits for states, especially those in the process of democratic consolidation.
Especially if they aspire to join the established and lucrative organizations that are created and
populated by democracies, like NATO and the EU. Often, these states have weaker domestic
institutions than consolidated regimes and their political and economic stability is questionable.
Credibility can affect outcomes such as the likelihood of basic cooperation, whether a state is
seen as a viable partner in international politics, but it can also have more tangible effects, like
whether a state has access to much needed international and domestic capital. States whose
institutions have only recently been created are often well-served delegating to independent
organizations when they need to cultivate a reputation as a credible actor. “Countries striving to
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set up good domestic institutions could try to signal how serious they are by subjecting
themselves voluntarily to the constraints of IOs,” (Dreher and Voight, 2011).
When states form an international organization, they are able to design the rules
according to their own interests. As Koremenos points out, “states and other international actors
shape institutions to solve the specific problems they face…(and) design variations are largely
the result of rational, purposive interactions” (2007, 192). Koremenos and Betz (2013) consider
the inclusion of dispute resolution mechanisms in the design of international agreements to be a
“deliberate choice by governments, made to address specific cooperation problems” (Koremenos
and Betz, 371). They go on to argue that formal dispute settlement procedures screen out states
that are less likely to comply with the terms of the agreement and that they reduce the likelihood
that disputes arise (372). When we consider democratizing and newly democratized states, we
might expect these states to prefer to include some type of formalized dispute resolution
mechanism in the agreements they design for several reasons based on the set of conjectures
presented by Koremenos (2007).
She argues that states facing problems of uncertainty, either about behavior or about the
state of the world, are more likely to include delegated dispute resolution provision in their
international agreements. There is a high level of uncertainty surrounding democratizing states,
as they are typically new regimes without a record of behavior. Regime change often creates a
domestic commitment problem and is often seen in “volatile and polarized political systems,
where a government’s preferences may change dramatically over time” (Koremenos 2013, 377).
Consolidating democratic reforms is a difficult job and often leaders may use international
agreements to tie their hands, and the hands of their successors, domestically by imposing
constraints on domestic political behavior in an effort to more successfully implement these
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tough reforms in the face of domestic concerns (Goldstein et al. 2000; Pevehouse, 2005;
Pevehouse and Mansfield, 2006) by checking the behavior of potential future political
opposition. Democratizing states may seek to constrain the behavior of future domestic actors so
that they do not interfere with the consolidation process. “…subjecting others – such as the
current opposition – to such rules (constraining behavior) might even increase the current
government’s utility” (Dreher and Voight, 2011).
Koremenos also argues that states facing enforcement or commitment problems are more
likely to include delegated dispute resolution provisions in their international agreements. When
states find themselves in this predicament, they may want to find a way to reassure the
international community that they are committed to cooperation and plan on upholding their
commitments. One way to do this is by becoming a member of an IGO, because “membership in
IOs can be used by nation state governments to signal their commitment to follow certain
policies” (Drexel and Voight, 2011). If IGO membership can serve as a signaling vehicle (Poast
& Urpelainen, 2018; Pevehouse 2005), including dispute resolution mechanisms may serve as a
credible signal to the international community by helping solve the enforcement problem.
Cheating on international agreements can incur reputational costs, so being publicly identified as
a cheater through dispute resolution processes can be a deterrent to cheating in the first place.
Accepting this constraint is a credible signal that these states are committed to upholding their
commitments even when they disagree with an action taken by the group. Opting into these
agreements means that a state agrees to follow the rules, even when those rules occasionally
contradict its own individual interests. Abiding by a binding decision handed down by an
international organization can be difficult but can also show the international community that a
state is willing to uphold its commitments.
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States seeking to enhance their international credibility under conditions of uncertainty
may prefer to include higher levels of formalization in the international organizations they form
because this could “contribute to a more lawlike character of international agreements, thereby
enhancing their legitimacy and effectiveness,” thus resulting in the inclusion of formal dispute
resolution mechanisms (Koremenos and Betz, 375). Further, Keohane, Moravscsik, and
Slaughter argue that “courts and tribunals represent a key dimension of legalization” (2000, 457),
and this perception of legality can lend credibility to those states subjecting themselves to these
constraints and can increase the legitimacy of these agreements.
5.1. Hypothesis: Democratizing states are more likely to include formalized dispute resolution
mechanisms in the charters of IGOs they are founding members of and have input into the design
process.
Because democratizing states are facing issues of credibility within the international
community based on high levels of uncertainty about behavior, uncertainty about the future, and
because they seek to tie the hands of political opponents who may come into power in the future,
I expect these states to be more likely to include formalized dispute resolution mechanisms in the
IGOs they form and design. Disputes within an organization can threaten the future of
cooperation, and if cooperation ends then so do the benefits. Any state that opts into an
international organization does so because they want the benefits that cooperation will yield. For
democratizing states, these benefits can be critical for a successful transition by helping them
overcome that unique set of challenges presented by international concerns of credibility and
uncertainty.

86

6. Research Design
I have assembled a new dataset compiled of measurements of certain design
elements of interest so that I may test my hypothesis. The unit of analysis for the tests run in this
investigation is the year of IGO formation (IGO-year) of three different categories of IGOs. This
investigation limits the sample to IGO-year of IGO formation to parse out the effect of
democratization on the likelihood that certain membership choices are made by groups of these
states at the time of IGO formation. The main dependent variable is Regional Constraints, the
key independent variable is the regime type of the founding membership of the IGO, and each
model includes several controls. More on the construction and operationalization of these
variables is discussed in sections 6.1, 6.2, and 6.3 of this paper.
My goal with this research is to compare the design choices within IGOs formed by
different sets of states. Specifically, I look at how groups of democratizing states make those
design choices as compared to the choices made by groups of states with a majority of founding
members having either democratic or nondemocratic regime types when they form new IGOs.
To do this systematically, I begin with the list of IGOs identified by Poast and Urpelainen (2018)
as being founded by democratizing states. There are twenty-seven IGOs included in this data9. I
then draw from the latest version (v3) of Intergovernmental Organizations data (Pevehouse et al.
2019) housed within the Correlates of War (COW) database and identify organizations founded
by democratic states and by autocratic states. The IGOs in this dataset are coded according to
mandate: social, political, and economic. I use the COW IGO data to first identify the mandate of
each IGO from Poast and Urpelainen to ensure that I am comparing these organizations with

9

One of the IGOs identified by Poast and Urpelainen as being founded by democratizing states, the Baltic

Environmental Forum, is not included in the COW IGO data, so I dropped it from this new dataset. A complete
list of the IGOs included in the data can be found in the Appendix to this paper in Table 5.
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similar ones. I was able to find the original founding charter for twenty-one of these IGOs, and
these are the IGOs I analyze and include in this dataset and analysis; the makeup of this group by
mandate is such: twelve economic organizations, seven political organizations, and two social
organizations.
Next, using the data in IGO-country-year format that included only founding member
states, I identified a comparable distribution across IGO mandates founded by a majority of
democratic states and IGOs founded by a majority nondemocratic group of states. To do this, I
use the founding member states’ Polity scores at the time of IGO creation, considering states
with a Polity score greater than or equal to seven to be consolidated democracies, those with
Polity scores less than or equal to negative seven to be consolidated autocracies, and those with a
score of less than seven but greater than negative seven to be anocracies. I then calculate the
democratic, anocratic, or autocratic density of each organization in the COW IGO dataset so that
I may identify those IGOs that are majority democratic or majority nondemocratic; meaning that
at least 51% of founding members met the democratic or nondemocratic threshold discussed
above. My goal was to build a dataset that would represent the greatest likelihood of specific
design elements being preferred by collective groups of states made up of a particular regime
type. To do this, I identified those organizations whose founding members were 51+%
democracies and then whose founders included 51+% nondemocracies. I then randomly chose
organizations that had five or more founding members from each mandate category to
correspond with the number of IGOs from each mandate category identified by Poast and
Urpelainen.
The criteria for choosing a particular IGO: being founded by at least five states, a
majority of whom shared a similar regime type, is more stringent that the criteria used by Poast
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and Urpelainen to identify IGOs founded by democratizing states. The IGOs they include in their
analysis upon which I am building this research are IGOs whose founding membership was
made up of at least twenty-five percent new democracies. I set the bar high for a couple of
important reasons. First, bargaining over the terms of agreements becomes more difficult as the
number of actors at the bargaining table increases. Five or more sovereign states coming together
to form a formal international governmental organization requires more actors to bargain over
allowances and constraints, ensuring that the design decisions likely did not come too easily. The
types of constraints on behavior that are built into an agreement may incrementally increase
participation costs by way of decreasing sovereignty.
I also required 51+% of the founding members to be of similar regime type so I may
make a reasonable assumption that these actors have generally similar interests, and that the
design choices made by these actors will reflect these interests. Although Poast and Urpelainen
use a much lower threshold in their consideration of IGOs founded by democratizing states, I
chose to use a higher threshold to increase the confidence of my comparisons.
To generate the IGO-year format of the final dataset used in this analysis, I collapsed the
data to reflect the design choices made by the collective group of founding member states in the
year the IGO was created. Each observation is an IGO in its founding year.
6.1 Dependent Variable: Inclusion of a Formalized Dispute Resolution Mechanism
The variation in dispute resolution options presents states with a choice between
informal, semi-formal, or highly formal methods for dispute resolution between and among
members should a dispute arise. In this paper, which represents a first cut at understanding
variation in institutional design driven by regime type, I do not distinguish between the four
options of dispute resolution presented by Koremenos et al. (2001), I simply follow their lead.
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Instead, I consider whether any formalized dispute resolution outside of negotiations between or
among members with no involvement by a third party is written into the charter. This can include
mediation, arbitration, or adjudication. In most cases, a third-party panel comprised of one
representative chosen by the complainant, one by the respondent, and one chosen either by both
parties, by the organization, or from another independent body like the International Court of
Justice, the European Court of Justice, etc. This is a dichotomous measure, coded as a 1 if there
is any formalized dispute resolution process outside of one-on-one negotiations, and 0 otherwise.
If there is no mention at all of dispute resolution processes then the organization is, of course,
coded as 0.
Out of the 73 IGOs in my sample, just over half of them (52.05%) included formalized
dispute resolution mechanisms (DRMs) according to my coding procedure. Within the subset of
IGOs formed by democratizing states, 11 out of 21 included formalized DRMs. Interestingly,
over half (53.85%) of democracies chose not to include formalized DRMs, and over half
(57.69%) of autocracies did include them. A complete breakdown of the distribution by IGO
regime type can be found in Table 4.1.
Regime Category

Formalized DRM

No Formalized DRM

Total

Democratizing*

11

10

21

Majority Democratic

12

14

26

Majority

15

11

26

38

35

73

Nondemocratic
Total

Table 4.1: Dispute Resolution Mechanisms by Regime Type Summary Statistics
*Based on Poast & Urpelainen 2018
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6.2 Key Independent Variable: Regime Type of IGO Founding Membership
The primary independent variable in this analysis represents a measure of the regime type
of the IGO by identifying the IGOs in the dataset as being founded by a majority of democratic
actors or a majority of non-democratic actors. This was done by calculating the democratic
density (Pevehouse, 2002) of each organization based on the regime type of its founding
members in the first year of the organization according to Polity2 scores, and then coding the
organizations as democratic (1), anocratic (2), or autocratic (3). This process was described in
more depth earlier in section 4.2 of this paper. I then assigned a dichotomous designation of
democratic (1 if more than half of the founding members were democracies, 0 otherwise) or
nondemocratic (1 if more than half of the founding members were nondemocracies, including
both anocracies and autocracies, 0 if otherwise) to each IGO.
The distribution of this variable is wide, ranging from 0% to 100%. Of all 73 IGOs in the
dataset, 15 are made up of zero democracies. Thirty of them are made up of 25% or less
democratic members and 38 have less than 50% democratic members. Thirty-five IGOs are
made up of 50% or more democratic members, 24 have more than 75% democratic members,
and seven are made up of 100% democracies. The full distribution can be found in figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1
6.3 Control Variables
Because powerful states are less likely to prefer to cede sovereignty in IGO participation,
I control for whether a major power was a founding member of the IGO or not, thereby having
influence over the design process. I expect that major powers will be resistant to including
dispute resolution mechanisms that empower a third party to issue binding decisions which will
further constrain their behavior and could have reputational costs. I consider the Permanent Five
of the United Nations Security Council (United Kingdom, the United States, France, China, and
Russia) to be major powers. This variable is a dichotomous measure, a 1 indicating that there
was at least one major power founding member, and 0 if not.
I also include a control for number of founding members. As the number of members
increases, the bargaining process becomes more difficult since there are more interests and
preferences to contend with. When there are a high number of members in an agreement, it
becomes more difficult to negotiate diplomatically, either because more than one party may be
aggrieved by the violator and one-on-one negotiation simply is not efficient, or because the
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noncompliance is coming from a structural problem with the design of the treaty itself and the
entire organization should convene to consider jointly modifying the agreement (Schneider 1999,
753).
7. Results
To test my hypothesis: Democratizing states are more likely to include formalized dispute
resolution mechanisms in the charters of IGOs they are founding members of and have input into
the design process, I run several models and present the results below. I do not only run tests on
the main independent variable of interest: IGOs founded by democratizing states10, but I also run
analyses considering IGOs whose founders were mostly democracies11 and those whose founders
were mostly nondemocracies12. These additional tests allow us to understand how IGOs designed
by different types of members may or may not vary and provides insight into the outcome of
bargaining processes by actors of different regime type.
Models 1 through 1.4 test the hypothesis by examining those IGOs formed by
democratizing states. The results can be found in table 4.2. Model 1 is a bivariate logistic
regression testing whether IGOs formed by democratizing states are more likely to include
dispute resolution mechanisms in their founding charters. While the positive coefficient indicates
that these states are more likely than not to include DRMs, the coefficient is insignificant. In
models 1.1 through 1.4 I include my control variables, first one at a time and finally all in one
regression to find out if there is any change. In both model 1.1 and 1.4, economic IGOs are more
likely to include dispute resolution mechanisms, and this is statistically significant in both cases.

10

These are IGOs identified by Poast & Urpelainen (2018, XX) to have been founded by democratizing or recently
democratized states.
11
IGOs considered “democratic” for the purpose of this analysis were founded by at least 50.01% consolidated
democracies, meaning that the state, at the time of founding, had a Polity2 score equal to or greater than 7.
12
IGOs considered “nondemocratic” for the purpose of this analysis were founded less than 50.0% consolidated
democracies, meaning that the state, at the time of founding, had a Polity2 score equal to or greater than 7.
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However, the other control variables, whether a major power is a founding member or not, and
the number of members, are both insignificant. The predicted probabilities shown in figures 4.2
through 4.6 further illustrate these findings, as in each case the confidence bands are wide and
overlap one another.
Table 4.2

Model 1

Model 1.1

Model 1.3

DRM

Model
1.2
DRM

DRM

Model
1.4
DRM

Variables

DRM

IGO founded by
Democratizing States

0.0183

0.00437

-0.266

-0.0574

-0.183

(0.518)

(0.536)
1.061**
(0.488)

(0.566)

(0.572)

(0.617)
0.980**
(0.497)
-0.557
(0.554)
0.00411
(0.0303)
-0.176
(0.675)

Economic IGO
Major Power Member

-0.706
(0.514)

Number of Members
Constant

0.0770
(0.278)

-0.512
(0.395)

0.529
(0.436)

-0.00872
(0.0279)
0.214
(0.519)

Observations
73
73
73
73
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 4.2

Figure 4.3
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73

Figure 4.4

Figure 4.5

Figure 4.6
To compare design choices of democratizing states to the choices made by states with
different regime types, I run the same logistic regressions with the same control variables on the
group of IGOs formed by a majority of democratic states and by a majority of autocratic states.
Models 2 through 2.4 consider IGOs formed by a majority of democratic states. The results can
be found in table 4.3. Similar to the tests run on IGOs formed by democratizing states, the only
variable that is significant is the economic IGO variable, indicating that democratic states are
more likely to include dispute resolution mechanisms in economically oriented IGOs. Overall,
democratic states are less likely to include dispute resolution mechanisms, as indicated by the
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negative signs on all but one coefficient, though this result is not statistically significant in any
iteration of the model. The predicted probabilities further illustrate these findings, as the
confidence bands are wide and overlapping, and can be found in figures 4.7 through 4.11.
Table 4.3
Variables

Model 2
DRM
Included

Model 2.1
DRM
Included

Model 2.2
DRM
Included

Model 2.3
DRM
Included

Model 2.4
DRM
Included

Democratic IGO

-0.368
(0.491)

-0.421
(0.510)
1.081**
(0.492)

0.182
(0.705)

-0.387
(0.560)

-0.238
(0.789)
1.027**
(0.513)
-0.370

Economic IGO
Major Power
Member

-0.742
(0.680)

Number of
Members
Constant

Observations

0.214
(0.293)

-0.371
(0.401)

0.405
(0.345)

0.00203

(0.723)
0.0101

(0.0289)
0.193
(0.410)

(0.0303)
-0.346
(0.573)

73
73
73
73
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 4.7

Figure 4.8
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73

Figure 4.9

Figure 4.10

Figure 4.11
Models 3 through 3.4 consider those IGOs formed by a majority autocratic states and the
results are shown in table 4.4. Again, the only statistically significant result presents on
economically oriented IGOs, suggesting that, regardless of regime type, when states design an
IGO to address economic cooperation, they are more likely to include a formalized dispute
resolution mechanism in the agreement. The positive coefficients indicate that autocracies are
more likely to include DRMs, but this result is statistically insignificant. These results are
illustrated in figures 4.12 through 4.16 showing the predicted probabilities of each model, again,
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each having wide and overlapping confidence bands due to the statistical insignificance of the
results.
Table 4.4
Variables

Nondemocratic
IGO

Model 3
DRM
Included

Model 3.1
DRM
Included

Model 3.2
DRM
Included

Model 3.3
DRM
Included

Model 3.4
DRM
Included

0.353

0.420

0.134

0.343

0.270

(0.493)

(0.512)
1.085**
(0.493)

(0.534)

(0.494)

(0.558)
1.020**
(0.502)
-0.410

Economic IGO
Major Power
Member

-0.569
(0.511)

Number of
Members
Constant

Observations

Figure 4.12

-0.0426
(0.292)

-0.673
(0.420)

0.333
(0.449)

-0.00616

(0.580)
0.00607

(0.0254)
0.0423
(0.455)

(0.0288)
-0.448
(0.633)

73
73
73
73
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 4.13
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73

Figure 4.14

Figure 4.15

Figure 4.16
8. Conclusion
In each model, the only statistically significant variable is Economic IGO, and because it
is statistically significant in each case, we might take away from this analysis that the regime
type of the states is unimportant but the mandate of the IGO is. Economically oriented IGOs
have the potential to provide important and tangible benefits for all their members, regardless of
regime type. For democratizing states this is especially important, as they tend to be less
economically stable than consolidated regimes. It may also be that, since the inception of the
WTO and its dispute settlement process, that states of all regime type forming economic
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organizations value independent and formalized resolution processes over diplomatic ones
because they have been exposed to the process at the WTO.
The international community has become more institutionalized over time, and this
system of institutionalization includes the formation of formal international organizations. IGOs
provide states with many benefits, both tangible and intangible. Some of the intangible benefits
include reduced levels of uncertainty provided by the establishment of sets of rules and
constraints on the behaviors of states. Any state entering into a formal cooperative agreement
expect that all members of the agreement will uphold their commitments. And in most cases,
most of the time, states do just this. However, occasionally disputes arise, and this can threaten
the future of cooperation. One option available to states looking to solve this problem is to
include formalized dispute resolution mechanisms in the charters and rules of procedure of the
organizations they design. Including DRMs can provide an array of benefits including screening
out potential members who may be less likely to comply, they can tie the hands of leaders of
member states who may prefer defection from cooperation in the interest of short-term political
gain, and they can increase the credibility of states who may be working toward building
credibility within the international community. DRMs also further legalize agreements by
establishing formal procedures that may often have binding consequences for states.
Democratizing states are more likely to form new IGOs rather than join existing ones
because sometimes joining existing IGOs is simply too difficult at the time. But these states still
want the benefits to be had from formal cooperation through an IGO, and forming one allows
them to design the rules in ways that are most likely to serve their interests. While the results of
this analysis did not support my hypothesis, that democratizing states would be more likely to
include dispute resolution mechanisms into the IGOs they design, it does present further
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evidence that economic agreements are more likely to contain formalized dispute resolution
processes. It also encourages further investigation into how and why states may choose to
include DRMs.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION

When states come together to solve problems, they bargain over the specifics of
cooperation. When they decide to formalize cooperation by creating a new international
governmental organization, they must bargain over what design mechanisms will be included to
best serve each individual members’ interests and the interests of the collective group. The
results will determine how costs and benefits will be distributed, who will be let in and who will
be kept out, how decisions will be made, and how disputes will be resolved.
This project considers design choices made by a particularly unique group of states who
face a particularly unique set of challenges: states undergoing democratic transition and
consolidation. Regime change is often difficult, and this is especially true for former autocratic
states who desire to democratize. There are economic, and domestic political hurdles, and they
must overcome legacies of weak and usually contradictory institutions that present resistance,
even when change is desired by both the public and elites. One option available to democratizing
states is to garner support from the international community through IGO membership, which
seems to have a positive effect on successful democratic transition and consolidation.
Because it is often difficult for democratizing states to join some of the established IGOs
that would provide substantial lucrative benefits, these states frequently opt to form new
organizations that will present opportunity for traditional cooperation benefits like efficiency
gains, reduced transaction costs, but will also allow them to credibly signal to the international
community that they are viable international partners and are committed to democratic
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consolidation. One way they can achieve both of goals of tangible benefits of cooperation and
credible international signaling, is to design their organizations in ways that serve those interests.
Scholars of international organizations would likely widely agree that membership
matters. Membership rules are the first of the five key dimensions of institutional design
variation presented by Koremenos et al. (2001). One need only look at the hotly contested
enlargement initiatives over the last twenty years being debated in two of the world’s most
influential IGOs, the EU and NATO, to realize that membership matters are of great importance
to states and to organizations. If we quickly consider these two organizations, we will see that the
prospect of admitting new members has resulted in both support and resistance from several
different types of actors in both cases.
Today’s European Union began in 1951 as the European Coal and Steel Community
when six states, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany
sought to create a supranational organization that would create interdependency and help control
steel and coal producers in the wake of the two great wars. Placing the continent’s main coal and
steel producers under regulation of a central authority would help control two of the region’s
problematic members, hopefully avoiding aggressions of the past, while providing valuable
economic benefits by creating a regional trading area. The European Coal and Steel Community
would go through a few evolutions before it became known as the European Union, which is
today’s largest common economic market and an organization known for encouraging
liberalization and for fostering democracy on the continent.
Between its inception and today, the organization has seen six enlargements, and
membership has gone from the original founding six states to a total of twenty-seven today
(since the exit of the United Kingdom in 2020). In 1973, the organization admitted Denmark,
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Ireland, and the United Kingdom; in 1981, Greece; in 1986, Spain and Portugal became
members, and in 1995, Austria, Finland, and Sweden joined. These enlargements were relatively
smooth, as most of these countries were quite “European,” having stable democratic political and
capitalist market economic systems. The most controversial enlargements happened in 2004 and
in 2007, when the Union decided to admit several former Communist and even Soviet states. In
2004, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, were
admitted, and in 2007, Cyprus, Malta, Bulgaria, and Romania joined. There was a feeling of
apprehension on the parts of the existing members towards these enlargements, “Europeans and
their leaders were not ready or felt unable to absorb new members to the club for fear of
overwhelming its processes and institutions while undermining their own economic prospects,”
(Economides, 2020, i). This feeling resurfaced in 2013 when Croatia was admitted.
Most of the new members of these enlargements had overcome the legacy of
Communism and years of being in the Soviet sphere of influence. Many of the EU’s members
felt that these states may not be ready to contribute fully to the organization and may end up
being more costly than the benefits they brought into the organization were worth. On the flip
side, pro-Western advocates believed that this enlargement was important to continue to
encourage democratic political and liberal economic development in Europe and to contain
Russian influence on the continent. For the Union, enlargement was as much an organizational
interest as it was a geopolitical one, with the objective of stabilizing the Central and Eastern
European region post-Cold War (Sperling, 1999). It had taken many years for these countries to
fulfill the rigorous conditions of the acquis, the conditions to accession often completed in stages
that required full transition to a market economy and established democracy (Pridham, 2005;
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005.)
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The existing members of the EU were not the only ones resistant to the accession of this
unique group of states. Russia has objected to further enlargement of the organization, viewing it
as an encroachment into Russia’s longstanding sphere of influence and a threat to its geopolitical
position of power in the region. As discussed in Chapter Two of this project, an authoritarian
state sharing a border with a state that undergoes a democratic transition is more likely to
experience a similar type of regime change. Russia and its head of state, Vladimir Putin, resist
this prospect at every level, condemning enlargement on the international stage and working to
sow distrust in the EU and NATO domestically and in those states still in its sphere of influence
who may indicate an interest in a Westward shift (Greene, 2012).
A similar situation exists within one of the most important and widely known collective
security organizations in the world, NATO. Another organization founded and populated by
wealthy, western democracies, NATO has been widely credited for its role in the longeststanding peace in Europe. Its membership has enlarged similarly to that of the EU, and has been
met with similar resistance, both within the organization and from its neighbors to the East.
NATO was also created in response to the two great wars to encourage those members on the
European and North American continents to interact peacefully and to encourage the peaceful
settlement of disputes globally. Twelve states, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland,
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United
States formed NATO in 1949. In 1952, it admitted Greece and Turkey; West Germany joined in
1955, and Spain in 1982. Enlargement stood still until the end of the Cold War, when several
noted international relations theorists including Kenneth N. Waltz, and John J. Mearsheimer
argued that NATO, “without an external enemy (i.e., the Soviet Union) the Alliance would lose
its reason for existence” (Waltz and Mearsheimer in Hendrickson, 100). However, in 1999
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Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic were admitted despite outward resistance by Russia
and quite a bit of internal debate within the organization. In 2004, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined, and Albania and Croatia were admitted in
2009. The most recent accessions were Montenegro in 2017 and North Macedonia in 2020.
Starting with the 1999 expansion, there was substantial resistance amongst members of
NATO that these new admittees may not be able to carry their weight, financially or militarily.
The concerns were not unlike the concerns of the EU member states regarding the 2004, 2007,
and 2013 EU enlargements; would these new members be able to contribute to the organization
in a way that offsets the costs of their admission, or would they become burdens for the existing
members? In the United States, there has been a long-running debate regarding the viability of
NATO and the continuation of US membership given the extraordinary financial burden that
some of these less economically developed members present when they are unwilling or unable
to contribute the minimum required financial contribution. Supporters of the continuation of
NATO in its current state argue that the geopolitical benefits of NATO outweigh the financial
costs borne by its wealthier members.
Despite apprehension, in each case, the organizations allowed the new member states to
join. In the EU, this requires a recommendation by the European Commission, majority approval
in the European Parliament, unanimous approval by the European Council, as well as approval of
the national parliaments of each EU member state. This all takes place only after a potential new
member state has completed the long and arduous application and candidacy requirements. As
far as NATO membership is concerned, potential new members must be invited to join by the
North Atlantic Council, and the invitation requires consensus among all members.
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All of this to say, membership criteria and constraints is one of the most early and most
critical decisions that the founding states of an organization make. This is why I consider it first
in this project. My findings in Chapter 1 indicate that democratizing states are more likely to
limit membership access regionally. This makes sense, as we expect regional partners to be more
likely to trade with one another, to come into conflict with one another, and to experience regime
change if their neighbors do. Sharing a border with a democracy increases the likelihood that an
autocracy will democratize. Sharing IGO membership with democracies can have a similar
effect, so extending IGO membership opportunities to regional neighbors makes sense. It gives
these states a chance to generate collective benefits that will help them consolidate democracy,
as well as the ability to monitor those states in the region who may otherwise be resistant to
neighborhood regime change.
Once they decide who is let in and who is kept out, the founders can decide how to
distribute power amongst member states. Chapter 2 of this project investigates the choices
regarding vote distribution and decision-making thresholds that democratizing states prefer when
they are designing a new IGO. My findings suggest that regime type does not drive these choices
much at all. In each case, when I consider IGOs formed by democratizing states, by democratic
states, and by nondemocratic states, only the number of members seems to have any influence
over the decision-making threshold-related design choices. As number of members increases,
states of all regime types are more likely to prefer some version of majority-rule over
consensus/unanimous requirements. I expect that this is because majority voting takes veto
power away, paving the way for more decisions to be passed.
Chapter 3 considers what happens when states disagree and find themselves involved in a
dispute within an organization. In nearly every case, members are encouraged to settle disputes
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peacefully amongst themselves through diplomatic negotiations. Sometimes, that is the only
provision for dispute resolution that is explicitly laid out in an organization’s design. But about
half of international agreements contain some formalized dispute resolution process (Koremenos,
2007). States can choose some form of mediation, arbitration, or in-house adjudication to resolve
disputes between members, or they can choose to delegate to an existing court. While delegation
to an existing court may seem like the most unbiased approach to dispute resolution, states may
prefer to keep the process in-house for several reasons. An existing court may not have
jurisdiction over a case or may choose not to hear it. States may feel more vulnerable to an
undesirable outcome in a third-party venue than they might should they keep the decision within
the organization. I find, once again, that regime type does not seem to be driving these decisions.
IGO mandate, however, does, in the case of economically oriented IGOs. Democratizing,
democratic, and nondemocratic states are all more likely to include formalized dispute resolution
mechanisms in the economic organizations they create. I expect that this is because economic
benefits are highly important to states and a dispute amongst members has the potential to
interrupt those benefits and the results would be domestically problematic politically. Formal
dispute resolution processes also further legalize agreements, and this can increase agreements’
legitimacy, thereby enhancing the credibility of members to follow through on their
commitments.
Implications for Cooperation and Organizational Design Research
Scholars of international cooperation and of international organizations have made great
strides towards a fuller understanding of why states cooperate through IGOs. We know that
formalizing cooperation can provide many benefits to states, ranging from efficiency gains,
reduced transaction costs, and increases in credibility. Membership in IGOs can help states
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address issues of uncertainty, both about others’ behavior and about the future, and it can tie the
hands of leaders in ways that may encourage continued cooperation in the name of future
benefits at the expense of short-term gains.
The literature on international organization design has also helped us understand more
about the choices made by states when they formalize cooperation and how those choices can
affect cooperative outcomes. How organizations are designed helps determine who will have
access to the gains from cooperation and who will not, how costs and benefits will be distributed,
and how states who do not comply with the rules will be punished. IGO design is important to
states because it is driven by their interests and preferences. But, of course, we still do not have a
complete understanding of why states make the choices they make given the wide range of
choices available to them.
The papers in this project provide insight into the design process as it is undertaken by
actors with different regime types. We learn that there are a few design elements that different
states may prefer, and there are some design choices that do not seem to be driven by regime
type. Democratizing states were more likely to constrain membership access to regional partners
during the Cold War. They may be slightly more likely to prefer majority voting as the number
of members increases, but this is also true of democratic and autocratic states. And, regardless of
regime type, states are more likely to include formal dispute resolution processes when they form
economically oriented organizations. While not every statistical test performed in this paper
series yielded significant results, we are left with a greater understanding of the role that regime
type may (or may not) play in the bargaining and design process.
Limitations of this Project
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When I started this project, I expected to be able to analyze the founding charters and the
rules of procedure for each of the IGOs Poast and Urpelainen (2018) identify as being formed by
democratizing states. I also had plans to include the same information for the same number of
economic, political, and social IGOs in three different categories: IGOs founded by 100%
democratic members, by 100% anocratic members, and 100% autocratic members. I also wanted
to limit those IGOs to organizations founded by at least 10 states. This would have given me a
sample size of over 100 IGOs. This proved difficult, however, because there are not a lot of
IGOs that fit those rigorous criteria. I had to compromise on the number of members as well as
the regime type density, settling for IGOs that were founded by a majority of democratic
members and a majority of nondemocratic members, eliminating the pure anocratic category
entirely, instead including anocracies in the nondemocracy category. I also had to eliminate the
high number of members requirement because it simply did not work. It was too high a
threshold.
I was also unable to find the charters and rules of procedure for all of the IGOs in Poast
& Urpelanen, so five of those organizations are not included in the data. In many cases,
obtaining the rules of procedure was not possible due to time constraints. The COVID-19
pandemic also hit as I was in the middle of this project, so access to resources was limited for
quite some time. I was left at the mercy of the internet and what was available via online means,
as libraries were closed for quite some time. I also made attempts to contact several IGOs in my
sample to request copies of their founding documents. Initially, this was a success, but because
of the pandemic, many were working with skeleton crews only, meaning that my scholarly
inquiries went unanswered. In summary, I completed this project with the data I had rather than
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the data I would have preferred. This analysis is the product of that data and provides an
acceptable first cut at explaining the role of regime type in IGO design.
Opportunities for Future Research
While the data used in this project could be considered incomplete, and the statistical
findings are short on significance, this project does present a jumping-off point for future
research into the behavior of democratizing states and of IGO design processes more generally.
This study is admittedly based on a relatively small sample size, in part because there are a finite
number of IGOs that have been created by democratizing states. There is opportunity to continue
an investigation into design choices based on regime type and to expand on this original dataset
in the future. While democratizing states are a unique group of actors faced with a unique set of
challenges that may be well served by IGO membership, this project indicates that we are limited
in our analytical capabilities because regime change is somewhat uncommon and takes
considerable time.
One opportunity is to build and expand on this dataset, as it is relatively small compared
to many other studies. By including more international organizations, without limiting them
based on the number of IGOs founded by democratizing states, I may find that there is more of a
connection between regime type and design choices. I could also expand the dataset so that I am
able to investigate the connection between regime type and IGO mandate. Because I use the
Poast & Urpelainen list of IGOs as my group of interest, I am limited here to a finite number of
IGOs in each mandate category. Including more IGOs of every mandate would present the
opportunity for a more comprehensive study into the role regime type may play in design choices
based on mandate. This derives directly from the finding in Chapter 3 indicating that economic
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IGOs are more likely to include formalized dispute resolution mechanisms regardless of the
regime type of the designers.
There is also a clear opportunity to expand on the ideas presented in Chapter 3 by
considering previous experience with DRMs in the WTO context and investigate whether that
experience may influence future design choices. I did not have time to include this data in the
analysis conducted here, but would like to for a future project to answer the question, do states
who have had previous experience with the WTO dispute resolution process tend to prefer the
inclusion of DRMs in international agreements when they are a founding member and have input
into the design process? Does this preference vary based on whether the state was the
complainant or the respondent? The current state of this data does not allow me to test that
question here, but there is an opportunity to expand on the data to address this question.
In Summary
This analysis is a first cut at building on the research by Poast and Urpelainen (2018) that
found that democratizing states are more likely to form new IGOs rather than to join existing
ones. It also contributes to the design literature by considering whether regime type may drive
design choices and how those choices may vary based on regime type. Though the results were
insignificant here, we, as scholars of international cooperation now have a deeper understanding
of what factors may or may not be driving design choices when states decide to formalize
cooperation.
There is reason to expect variation based on regime type due to the variation in interests
and values driven by regime type. This was the original motivation behind this project; does
regime type drive design choices because interests of states with particular regime types vary
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according to regime type? While the statistical tests conducted for this project may indicate that
regime type is an unlikely factor, this is a first pass at understanding its role in choices of IGO
design. There is much still to be understood.
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Country Name

COW Country Code

Country Name

COW Country Code

Afghanistan

700

Laos

812

Albania

339

Latvia

367

Angola

540

Lithuania

368

Armenia

371

Moldova

359

Azerbaijan

373

Mongolia

710

Benin

434

Mozambique

541

Bulgaria

355

North Korea

731

China

710

Poland

290

Congo

484

Romania

360

Cuba

40

Russia

365

Czechoslovakia

315

Somalia

520

East Germany

265

South Yemen

680

Estonia

366

Tajikistan

702

Ethiopia

530

Turkmenistan

701

Georgia

372

Ukraine

369

Grenada

55

Uzbekistan

704

Hungary

310

Vietnam

816

Kazakhstan

705

Yugoslavia

345

Kyrgyzstan

703

Table 6.1: States coded as Former Communist Member, with COW Country Code
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